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This paper discusses the mechanics and regulation of 
participating and unit-linked variable payout annuities. 
These annuities offer benefits that are not fixed in either 
nominal or real terms but depend on the performance 
of the fund or funds in which the underlying reserve 
assets are invested, their profit sharing features, and the 
treatment of longevity risk.
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The paper focuses on the treatment of investment and 
longevity risks by different types of these annuities and 
underscores the challenge of establishing a robust and 
effective framework of regulation and supervision for 
these products. The paper also addresses the exposure of 
annuitants to integrity risk and places special emphasis 
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The basic motivation for writing this paper stems from the realization that all retirement products 
have their strong points but also suffer from serious shortcomings. Hence, policymakers may 
well favor a combination of payout options, covering different products at a particular point in 
time as well as different payout options over time. Variable payout annuities, which offer 
benefits that are not fixed in either nominal or real terms but depend on investment performance, 
profit sharing rules, and the treatment of longevity risk, may play an important part in the 
retirement markets of some countries. 
 
All types of retirement products have strong and weak points. Fixed real annuities protect against 
longevity, investment  and inflation risks  but require access  to  an ample supply of inflation-
indexed securities, which is lacking in most middle and low income countries. For their part, 
fixed nominal annuities are exposed to inflation risk and thus fail to provide adequate protection, 
especially to long-lived individuals. In addition, fixed annuities, real or nominal, are exposed to 
annuitization risk, i.e., the risk of annuitizing at an inopportune time when financial markets are 
depressed and the cost of fixed annuities is high.  
 
Variable  payout  annuities  provide  protection  against  longevity  risk  and  allow  for  some 
participation in the higher (but more volatile) returns of corporate equities and other real assets. 
They  also  avoid  the  annuitization  risk  because  their  benefit  payments  vary  with  investment 
performance and are not fully determined by the prevailing conditions at the time of retirement. 
But VPAs are exposed to investment and inflation risks, are more complex to design and regulate 
than fixed annuities, and may suffer from much higher charges. They require a high level of 
integrity and meaningful transparency on the part of providers to ensure the fair treatment of 
annuitants and raise difficult regulatory and supervisory challenges, especially in countries where 
the financial and insurance markets are not well developed.  
 
All types of life annuities, fixed as well as variable, suffer from two major shortcomings: they do 
not allow for bequests and they lack liquidity and flexibility. The latter is a major issue in view 
of the growing concern about the rising cost of long-term care. A recent paper found that the 
need to provide for long-term care is a crucial driver of precautionary savings, while the bequest 
motive is both strong and widely prevalent (Ameriks et al 2011). Term annuities and phased 
withdrawals avoid these last problems but do not protect against longevity risk. 
 
VPAs vary by the presence or absence of guaranteed minimum benefits and by their treatment of 
investment and longevity risks. Six types of VPAs are discussed in this paper: traditional, 
escalating and PPM participating annuities; and standard, CREF and PPM unit-linked annuities  
(see Box 1 and section 2). 
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For  all  types  of  VPAs,  the  providers  assume  the  investment  and  longevity  risks  for  the 
guaranteed minimum benefits. For the non-guaranteed benefits, the annuitants either as a group 
or  on  a  fund  basis  assume  the  investment  risk,  while  the  longevity  risk  is  shared  among 
annuitants,  either  as  a  pool  or  on  an  age  cohort  basis,  except  for  the  standard  unit-linked 
annuities where it is assumed by the providers.    
Box 1: Summary of VPA Features 
 
Traditional participating annuities offer guaranteed minimum benefits and discretionary bonuses that 
depend on investment performance and longevity experience. Providers allocate net investment results 
between shareholders and policyholders and use a smoothing mechanism for crediting bonuses in order to 
maintain stable bonus rates. In general, however, and despite their crucial role in determining the 
performance of these policies, both profit sharing rules and smoothing mechanisms suffer from a lack of 
transparency. 
 
Escalating participating annuities offer guaranteed benefits that are targeted to grow at a stable rate and 
may thus be better able to maintain their value in real terms. Regular bonuses are guaranteed once they 
are declared. This is their main difference from traditional participating annuities. Otherwise, they suffer 
from the same issue of lack of transparency. 
 
The PPM traditional participating annuities have two distinct features. They distribute 100 percent of 
the profits after deducting expenses; and they share the longevity risk among annuitants on an age cohort 
basis. Because they do not use a smoothing mechanism they are highly transparent, but annuity payments 
are more volatile than under the other types of participating annuities. The offer of guaranteed minimum 
benefits provides a floor to annuity payments. 
 
The standard unit-linked annuities share the investment risk among annuitants on a fund basis but the 
longevity risk is assumed by the providers. A fixed charge for expenses and mortality risk is stipulated in 
the contract, while 100 percent of net income is distributed to annuitants. Providers are required to create 
a mortality fluctuation reserve to cover their exposure to longevity risk. The offer of guarantees is 
covered by fees that are included in the stipulated annual charge. Providers are required to incorporate in 
their reserves the need to cover their guarantees or to use appropriate hedging facilities for their risk 
exposure. These unit-linked annuities are generally highly transparent and do not suffer from the 
controversies afflicting participating annuities. However, their guaranteed benefits are more difficult to 
price and require access to efficient hedging facilities. 
 
The CREF unit-linked annuities differ from the standard version in that both the investment and 
longevity risks are shared among annuitants on a fund basis. The providers are allowed to deduct from the 
gross investment income the actual expenses incurred as well as any charges for larger than expected 
increases in longevity. CREF annuities are not as transparent as standard unit-linked annuities or the PPM 
variety.  
 
The PPM unit-linked annuities share both the investment and longevity risks among annuitants, the 
former on a fund basis and the latter on an age cohort basis. They are highly transparent, but as currently 




VPAs  also  vary  by  the  level  of  transparency  of  their  profit  sharing  rules  and  smoothing 
mechanisms.  The  standard  unit-linked  annuities  and  the  two  PPM  annuities  are  highly 
transparent, while the CREF annuities and the traditional and escalating participating annuities 
suffer from a lack of transparency. The assumption of investment and longevity risks for the 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed benefits  and the level  of transparency of different  VPAs  are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Assumption of Investment and Longevity Risks 
  Investment Risk  Longevity Risk  Profit Sharing & 
Smoothing Mechanism 
Guaranteed Benefits: All 
Types 
Providers  Providers  Not Relevant 
       
Non Guaranteed Benefits:       
     Traditional Participating  All Annuitants  All Annuitants  Non Transparent 
     Escalating Participating  All Annuitants  All Annuitants  Non Transparent 
     PPM Traditional 
Participating 
All Annuitants  Age Cohorts  Transparent 
     Standard Unit-Linked  Annuitants by 
Fund 
Providers  Transparent 





     PPM Unit-Linked  Annuitants by 
Fund 
Age Cohorts  Transparent 
 
Some VPAs, such as the PPM unit-linked annuities where annuitants select the funds in which 
their balances are invested and may opt for funds that specialize in high risk  assets, are by 
construction high return/high risk products. Their exposure to investment risk is very high. Such 
products make sense when annuitants receive basic pension benefits from other sources that are 
adequate and secure so that an adverse outcome from their high-risk unit-linked annuities would 
not cause financial ruin in old age. 
 
At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  escalating  participating  annuities  invest  predominantly  in 
medium-term government and corporate bonds because they aim to declare bonuses that grow at 
a stable rate and are included in the guaranteed benefits once they are declared. Such annuities 
are exposed to moderate investment risk. Their returns are also likely to be moderate but their 
main  attraction,  in  addition  to  the  low  exposure  to  investment  risk,  is  that  they  avoid  the 
annuitization risk of fixed annuities, provide better protection against inflation risk than fixed or 
escalating  nominal  annuities,  and  can  replicate  the  benefits  of  fixed  real  annuities  without 
requiring access to an ample supply of inflation-linked securities. Their main shortcoming is the 
use of opaque smoothing mechanisms and concomitant lack of meaningful transparency. 
 
Of the six variants of VPAs, escalating participating annuities seem to be the most appropriate 
for the payout phase of mandatory pension pillars of middle-income countries that have the 
capacity to create a robust and effective regulatory and supervisory framework. The role of these 
annuities would be to complement a fixed real annuity provided by the public pillars one and/or iv 
 
zero in most countries or by the private pillar if an adequate supply of inflation-protected 
instruments is available.  
 
A detailed regulatory framework is essential in order to promote a fair treatment of annuitants, 
secure the long-term solvency of providers, and ensure that they operate with a high degree of 
integrity and meaningful transparency. These or any other VPAs would not be advisable for low 
and middle-income countries that lack the capacity to implement effective regulation and 
supervision. 
 
The regulations should start by specifying the calculation of initial benefits. This would entail the 
setting of both the assumed investment rate of return (AIR) and the mortality tables. Ideally, the 
AIR should be set at a low level, but not excessively so. A rate close to the long-term real rate of 
interest would be appropriate. Since the longevity risk is shared among annuitants, it is not 
necessary to use highly conservative mortality tables that project large improvements in 
mortality. However, the mortality tables should be updated regularly and should allow for 
realistic expectations of mortality improvements. Unisex mortality tables should be used where 
this is required by law. 
 
The computation of guaranteed benefits does not have to be made at the same AIR as the 
calculation of initial benefits. A lower rate, even zero percent, would be appropriate and could be 
combined with a more conservative mortality table. However, the guaranteed benefits should be 
adjusted for inflation and this should be taken into account in the computation of technical 
reserves. 
 
Caps should be imposed on operating fees but they should allow for a reasonable rate of return 
on the equity capital of providers and should be reviewed regularly to prevent situations where 
the caps become the norm. Caps on operating fees should be lowered when justified by the scale 
of operations. 
 
The regulations should specify a minimum rate of profit sharing to govern the distribution of net 
investment results, after deducting expenses and any charge for larger than expected increases in 
longevity, between policyholders and shareholders. An acceptable smoothing mechanism should 
also be adopted to apportion in a more transparent manner the profits allocated to policyholders 
between regular bonuses credited to policyholders and profits added to the collective bonus 
reserve. The smoothing mechanism should take into account the need to maintain stable bonus 
rates that aim to preserve the real value of guaranteed benefits and should specify the upper and 
lower bounds for regular bonus payments and for additions to the collective bonus reserve. 
 
Reserving policies should take fully into account the rising guaranteed benefits. These should be 
based on gender-specific mortality tables and should be discounted by using market-based 
maturity-dependent discount rates. An appropriate yield curve specified by the regulators should 
be used by all providers. The reserves should be equal to the higher of the value of annuity assets 
and the present value of guaranteed benefits. In cases of provider insolvency, government 
guarantees should cover the payment of guaranteed benefits up to specified reasonable levels. 
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Caps should be imposed on both broker commissions and surrender charges. Switching of 
annuity providers could be permitted, but if this is allowed, rules should specify the valuation of 
portable balances, which should also include a fair share of the collective bonus reserve. Transfer 
fees should also be regulated. When switching is allowed, special measures should be adopted to 
protect persons of advanced age from hard-selling practices. 
 
The marketing of VPAs should be subject to the usual conduct rules. However, to promote 
greater transparency and facilitate comparability, a centralized database with detailed data on 
profit-sharing policies, operating fees, and long-term performance should be maintained and be 
easily accessible. 
 
When regulating the offer of complex products it is important to have clear rules on all aspects of 
the products concerned. Any gaps in regulations would undermine their effectiveness. As 
experience with the offer of these products is gained, the regulations could be relaxed, provided 
there is an adequate degree of effective competition. 
 
A more flexible regulatory regime would rely on greater transparency and clear principles of cost 
allocation and profit sharing between annuitants and shareholders. The flexible regulation that is 
followed in Denmark would merit consideration. It allows annuity providers to determine their 
initial benefit payments and their own profit distribution policies and smoothing mechanisms but 
requires a high level of meaningful transparency. 
 
The case for centralized provision, along the lines of the Swedish PPM or the Danish ATP, 
should be considered when decentralized markets become highly oligopolistic. However, a 
centralized solution should not be envisaged unless public institutions operate with a high level 
of transparency and a sound governance structure. Such governance structures, autonomy and 
transparent reporting are needed ingredients for centralized systems to be immune from political 
interference. 
 
For countries where the creation of a robust regulatory framework is a major challenge, the 
authorities might prefer to authorize the offer of fixed real annuities or, in their absence, 
escalating nominal annuities in combination with either phased withdrawals or unit-linked 
annuities without any guarantees. 
 
Under this approach, retiring workers could be allowed to invest between 70 and 100 percent of 
their account balance in either a fixed real annuity or an escalating nominal annuity with annual 
benefits increasing at a specified rate (say, 2 percent). This would provide a guaranteed income 
with total or some protection against inflation. 
 
To mitigate annuitization risk, i.e., the risk that at the time of retirement asset prices and/or long-
term rates of interest are abnormally low, allowing annuities to be purchased on an instalment 
basis over a period of five to ten years could be considered. 
 
At the same time, retiring workers could be allowed to invest up to 30 percent of their balances 
in a phased withdrawal account or unit-linked annuity without any guarantees. They could invest 
these balances in a small number of underlying funds of their choice. This combination would vi 
 
probably achieve as good results as the offer of escalating participating annuities, provided of 
course that there is an adequate presence of well managed and regulated investment funds. 
 
The 70/30 threshold is indicative. Individual countries may opt for a higher or lower level, 
depending on the availability and level of a basic public pension. If the public pension is 
significant, a much higher proportion of balances than the 30 percent level suggested above 
could be allowed to be invested in unit-linked annuities. 
 
This paper draws a clear distinction between variable payout annuities (VPAs) that provide 
retirement income for life, and the US-style variable annuities with various guarantees that are 
effectively investment products with an option to annuitize. A relatively recent innovation of the 
latter, the lifetime guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (LGMWB), represents an interesting 
compromise between the conflicting objectives of longevity insurance with income security, on 
the one hand, and the demand for  investment flexibility with long-run potential and the bequest 
motive, on the other.  
 
However, the offer of such guarantees presupposes effective access not only to well-developed 
financial markets but also to liquid and efficient hedging facilities. Absent such access, it would 
be inappropriate to authorize their use among the payout options of a mandatory pension pillar.1 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1  Regulatory Challenge
1 
 
This paper discusses the mechanics and regulation of participating and unit-linked variable 
payout annuities (VPAs). These annuities offer benefits that are not fixed in either nominal or 
real terms but depend on the performance of the fund or funds in which the underlying reserve 
assets are invested, their profit sharing features, and the treatment of longevity risk. 
 
The basic motivation for writing the paper stems from the realization that all retirement products 
have their strong points but also suffer from serious shortcomings. Hence, policymakers may 
well favor a combination of payout options, covering different products at a particular point in 
time as well as different payout options over time.
2 Variable payout annuities may play an 
important part in the retirement markets of some countries. 
 
All types of retirement products have strong and weak points. Fixed real annuities protect against 
longevity, investment and inflation risks but require access to an ample supply of inflation -
indexed securities, issued by both the public and private sectors, to enable providers to hedge 
their risks  in an economically effective way.
3  Absent such hedging instruments, the cost of 
providing fixed real annuities would be prohibitively high. For their part, fixed nominal annuities 
provide protection against longevity and investment risks but are exposed to inflat ion risk and 
thus fail to provide adequate protection, especially to long-lived individuals. In addition, fixed 
annuities, real or nominal, are exposed to annuitization risk, i.e., the risk of annuitizing at an 
inopportune time when financial markets are depressed and the cost of fixed annuities is high.  
 
Variable participating and unit-linked annuities have their own advantages and shortcomings. 
They protect against longevity risk and allow  for some  participation in the higher  (and more 
volatile)  returns of corporate equities and other real assets .  As a result, t hey offer greater 
flexibility and potential for higher benefits. They also avoid the annuitization risk because their 
benefit  payments  vary  with  investment  performance  and  are  not  fully  determined  by  the 
prevailing conditions at the time of retirement. But VPAs are exposed to investment and inflation 
risks, are more complex to design and regulate than fixed annuities, and may suffer from much 
higher charges. They require a high level of integrity and meaningful transparency on the part of 
providers to ensure the fair treatment of annuitants and raise difficult regulatory and supervisory 
                                                             
1 In preparing this paper I benefited from extensive comments offered by Mark Fowler, actuary consultant, and 
from the assistance of Lars Billberg, Chief Actuary of the Swedish Pensions Agency, who provided detailed data and 
commentary on the operational aspects of PPM annuities. I am also indebted to John Ashcroft, Gregorio Impavido, 
Estelle James, Don McIsaac, Moshe Milevsky, John Pollner, Roberto Rocha, Heinz Rudolph, and Anita Schwarz for 
their insightful comments. Officials of several European regulatory agencies clarified some points of detail, while a 
group of actuaries linked to the International Actuarial Association provided some very helpful comments. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
2 This point is underscored in Rocha and Vittas (2010), a paper that addresses the policy issues, constraints and options in 
designing the payout phase of pension systems. 
3 Over the past few decades many OECD countries have expanded the supply of inflation-protected government 
bonds but Chile is a rare exception of a country where private sector long-term corporate and mortgage bonds are 
also linked to inflation. 2 
 
challenges,  especially  in  countries  where  the  financial  and  insurance  markets  are  not  well 
developed. 
 
All types of life annuities, fixed as well as variable, suffer from two major shortcomings: they do 
not allow for bequests and they lack liquidity and flexibility. The latter is a major issue in view 
of the growing concern about the rising cost of long-term care. A recent paper found that the 
need to provide for long-term care is a crucial driver of precautionary savings while the bequest 
motive is both strong and widely prevalent (Ameriks et al 2011). Term annuities and phased 
withdrawals avoid these last problems but do not protect against longevity risk. 
 
The offer of variable payout annuities raises several key questions. Under what conditions should 
participating and unit-linked annuities be authorized? What are the regulatory challenges and 
how can they be overcome? Should developing countries authorize their offer or would they be 
better  off  promoting  the  use  of  fixed  real  annuities  or,  in  their  absence,  escalating  nominal 
annuities? Which types of participating or unit-linked annuities should they favor? 
 
Many middle-income countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, aspire to establish 
robust and effective regulatory systems for the payout phase of their mandatory funded pension 
pillars.
4 Several of these countries currently face severe budgetary pressures and are engaged in 
policy reversals, ranging from reducing or even suspending contributions to their funded pillars 
to transferring all assets back to the public pillar. These measures will limit the growth of 
supplementary pension pillars and will delay the emergence of active markets for retirement 
products. In the longer run, however, when the budgetary problems are resolved, the funded 
second pillars are likely to resume their growth. Policymakers will then need to revisit the design 
of the payout phase, address the role that participating and unit-linked annuities may play in the 
new system, and confront the challenge of creating appropriately robust regulatory systems.  
 
1.2. Definition of Variable Payout Annuities (VPAs) 
 
In a strict sense, a variable payout annuity is any annuity that is not fixed in money terms. Under 
this definition, escalating nominal annuities, inflation-indexed annuities, participating (also 
known as with-profits) annuities, and unit-linked (also known as market-linked, investment-
linked or fund-linked) annuities would all be classified as VPAs. 
 
However, neither escalating nominal nor inflation-indexed annuities are usually treated as 
variable payout annuities. This is because annual payouts in escalating nominal annuities 
increase at a pre-determined rate and the value of future payments is known at the time of 
purchase, while inflation-indexed annuities vary at the rate of inflation and their payments are 
effectively fixed in real terms.  
 
Participating annuities usually involve a guaranteed benefit and also distribute a bonus 
depending on the performance of the fund operated by the provider.
5 In contrast, in unit-linked 
                                                             
4 Vittas et al (2010) discuss the design of the payout phase in several Central and Eastern European countries. 
5 It is not clear when participating annuities were first introduced. Participating life insurance policies have their 
origin in mutual insurance companies in the United Kingdom in the early part of the 19th century. These companies 
applied very high mortality rates on their policies at that time and distributed excess profits to their members by 
increasing benefits (Haberman et al, 2003). Participating annuities probably emerged in the latter part of the 19th or 3 
 
annuities that do not offer any guarantees, annual benefits fluctuate with the performance of one 
or more funds operated either by the annuity provider or by independent asset managers but 
selected by individual annuitants. 
 
A distinct feature of variable annuities is that depending on the composition of their asset 
portfolios, they may be exposed to significant investment risk. As a result, annual benefits may 
not just vary from year to year but may experience wide fluctuations, depending on the terms of 
the contracts, including the offer of guaranteed minimum benefits. However, another 
distinguishing feature is the treatment of longevity risk. In some contracts, this is borne by the 
providers, while in others it is shared among annuitants. 
 
In the United States variable annuities are extensively used during the accumulation stage in 
order to benefit from the tax advantages bestowed on them. These are in fact unit-linked 
investment products that are offered with a wide range of optional guarantees, covering 
minimum death, accumulation, income and withdrawal benefits. They also include an option to 
annuitize, although this is rarely exercised. For this reason, the term 'variable payout annuities' 
(VPAs) has been coined and is widely used to differentiate them from mere variable annuities 
that are not annuitized. They are also known as 'variable income annuities' (Dellinger 2006). 
 
In recent years, variable annuities, similar to those offered in the United States, have been 
introduced in Canada,
6 Asia and Europe. In some European countries, mainly because of their 
wide range of guarantees, variable annuities are perceived as different products from unit-linked 
annuities, which have been offered in some countries for more than two decades.
7 
 
1.3  The Purpose and Structure of the Paper 
 
This paper focuses on the treatment of investment and longevity risks by different types of 
participating and unit-linked annuities and underscores the challenge of establishing a robust and 
effective framework of regulation and supervision for these products. Special emphasis is placed 
on the need for a high level of meaningful transparency.  
 
The paper also addresses the exposure of annuitants to integrity risk, which is in some respects 
similar to bankruptcy risk, although it varies from it in two significant aspects: it does not imply 
the failure and closure of the annuity provider concerned; and its adverse effects may be 
undetected for a prolonged period. The paper includes a brief description of US-style variable 
annuities but does not contain a detailed discussion of their more complex risk management and 
regulatory issues. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the basic mechanics of the 
main types of participating and unit-linked annuities. Section 3 sets out the main advantages and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the beginning of the 20th century. Unit-linked annuities started to be offered in the United States in the 1960s and 
spread to other high income countries over the ensuing decades. 
6 Milevsky (2002) noted that VAs were not available in Canada in the past but were recently introduced (late 1990s?) 
within registered retirement savings plans. A more recent paper reviews the vast expansion of variable annuities in the 
Canadian market (Milevsky and Shao 2010).  
7 A recent consultation paper by CEIOPS (Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors), now 
EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority), confirms this perception (CEIOPS 2010).   4 
 
disadvantages of variable payout annuities relative to other retirement products and discusses in 
greater detail their exposure to investment risk. The ensuing sections address several regulatory 
issues. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the regulation of pricing and reserving policies, first for 
participating and then for unit-linked annuities. Section 6 focuses on the regulation of marketing 
policies, while section 7 covers the regulation of market structure, the prudential regulation of 
annuity providers, and the offer of government guarantees. All these regulatory issues are 
broadly similar for both types of annuities. 
 
The paper also has 3 annexes. The first presents the derivation of the basic formula for setting 
annual payments in unit-linked annuities. The second focuses on the detailed mechanics and 
performance of the two PPM annuities operated by the Swedish Pensions Agency (SPA). And 
the third contains a brief discussion of the types of benefit guarantees offered by US-style 
variable annuities and highlights the challenging regulatory issues raised by these products. 
2.  The Mechanics of the Main Types of VPAs 
 
2.1  Main Types of VPAs 
 
Like fixed annuities, variable payout annuities (VPAs), whether participating or unit-linked, 
come in several variants, such as single or multiple premium, joint or single life, immediate or 
deferred, with guaranteed periods of payment or not. They also vary by the presence or absence 
of guaranteed minimum benefits and by their treatment of investment and longevity risks. Six 
types of annuities are discussed below: 
 
i.  Traditional participating annuities; 
ii.  Escalating participating annuities; 
iii.  PPM traditional participating annuities; 
iv.  Standard unit-linked annuities; 
v.  CREF unit-linked annuities; and 
vi.  PPM unit-linked annuities. 
 
Traditional participating annuities offer guaranteed minimum benefits and discretionary 
bonuses that depend on the investment performance of the funds and the longevity experience of 
the pool of annuitants. These policies have been widely offered in European countries, where 
they have effectively been the mirror image of participating endowment life insurance policies. 
The providers assume both the investment and longevity risks for the guaranteed benefits, but 
these risks are shared among annuitants for the discretionary bonuses. The reserves are invested 
in funds managed by the providers. The profits are determined after the deduction of expenses 
and any charges for larger than expected increases in longevity. The profits are then distributed 
between policyholders and shareholders at the discretion of the providers but following some 
basic rules. In order to maintain reasonably stable bonus rates, providers use a smoothing 
mechanism for crediting bonuses to policyholders. This involves the creation of a collective 
bonus reserve (also known as unallocated bonus reserve). In general, and despite their crucial 
role in determining the performance of these policies, both profit sharing rules and smoothing 
mechanisms have suffered from a lack of transparency. 
 5 
 
Over time, traditional participating annuities have evolved into escalating participating 
annuities. A basic objective of these products is to offer guaranteed benefits that are targeted to 
grow at a stable rate and may thus be better able to maintain their value in real terms. The 
bonuses are calculated at a rate that aims to cover moderate inflation, are declared annually, and 
are then included in future guaranteed minimum benefits. However, the bonuses are not 
guaranteed before their declaration and may be suspended if financial performance is very weak, 
although providers adopt investment and bonus distribution policies that favor stable and 
predictable bonus policies. From time to time bonuses may reflect exceptional profits that may 
not be incorporated in the guaranteed benefits for future years. Escalating participating annuities 
are widely used in continental European countries, especially in Germany (where they are called 
dynamic participating annuities) and Denmark.
8  
 
In Sweden, the traditional participating annuities offered by the Swedish Pensions Agency for 
the funded component of the public pension system have two distinct features. The provider 
assumes the investment and longevity risks for the guaranteed minimum payments, but for the 
nonguaranteed benefits, while the investment risk is borne by all annuitants, the longevity risk is 
shared among annuitants on an age cohort basis. In addition, the SPA does not use a smoothing 
mechanism but distributes 100 percent of the profits after deducting expenses, thus making them 
highly transparent. These are referred to in this paper as the PPM traditional participating 
annuities because when they were first offered the agency responsible for the management of 
the funded component of the public pension system was known as the PPM 
(Premiepensionsmyndigheten – or Premium Pension Authority).
9  
 
The basic characteristic of the standard unit-linked annuities is that the investment risk is 
shared among annuitants but the longevity risk is assumed by the providers. A fixed charge for 
expenses and mortality risk is stipulated in the contract, while 100 percent of net income is 
distributed to annuitants. Unit-linked annuities are highly transparent and do not suffer from the 
controversies afflicting participating annuities. These annuities have been authorized throughout 
the United States and have over time evolved into the VAs (and VPAs) with guaranteed benefits. 
The providers assume both the longevity and investment risks for the guaranteed benefits. 
Standard unit-linked VPAs have been offered in many European and other countries for the past 
quarter of a century but the new US-style variable annuities were more recently introduced in 
several countries outside the United States. 
 
CREF unit-linked annuities differ from the standard version in that both the investment and 
longevity risks are shared among annuitants, the latter reflecting the longevity experience of the 
pool of annuitants of each fund. Their name derives from the special contract that has been 
authorized in New York for the TIAA-CREF, an insurance and pension institution that has 
specialized in offering retirement products to staff in academic institutions.
10 CREF annuities 
                                                             
8 The German annuity market is examined in von Gaudecker and Weber (2004) and Kaschutzke and Maurer (2010), 
while the Danish market is discussed in Andersen and Skjodt (2007). 
9 The PPM was created in 1994 but was merged into the Swedish Pensions Agency (SPA) in 2010. In addition to the 
participating annuity, a unit-linked product is also offered (see below and Annex B for more details). 
10 Over the years, the scope of operations of the TIAA-CREF has expanded and now covers people working in the 
academic, medical, cultural and research fields. In addition, the status of the TIAA CREF has changed into that of a 'for-
profit' institution offering products and services to the whole market and it is not clear how its policies and products will 
evolve in the future. 6 
 
have not been authorized in either Canada or the United Kingdom. The unit-linked annuities that 
have been introduced in continental Europe in the 1980s and 1990s appear to share the longevity 
risk among the whole pool of annuitants, i.e., they seem to follow the CREF approach in the 
United States, although the legal basis is not very clear.
11 
 
In the PPM unit-linked annuities, the investment risk is borne by the annuitants on the basis of 
the performance of the fund (or funds) selected by them, while the longevity risk is shared 
among annuitants on an age cohort basis. This is their basic difference with CREF annuities 
where the longevity risk is shared among all annuitants. No guaranteed minimum benefits are 
currently offered by the SPA for its unit-linked annuities.  
 
In all cases of variable payout annuities, providers are required to maintain reserves in 
segregated accounts and are not allowed to mix them with the general reserves they hold for the 
various types of fixed annuities. 
 
2.2  Calculation of Initial Benefit Payments 
 
All types of VPAs follow the same approach in setting the initial benefit payments. The net 
capital premium, i.e., the gross premium less any upfront charges, is divided by an appropriate 
annuity factor. This in turn is calculated by using an assumed investment rate of return (AIR) and 
an appropriate mortality table.
12 
 
Annuity providers set the AIR at a rate that is close to market levels and may also reflect the 
investment objective of the annuity. The regulators may impose an upper limit on the permissible 
level for the AIR.  
 
Annuity providers in Canada and the United States allow annuitants to select their own AIR from 
within a specified range. In Canada, this varies between 3 and 8 percent (Milevsky 2002), 
although no cap is imposed by the regulators, while in the United States the common range is 
between 3 and 5 percent, but it may reach 7 percent with approval from the state insurance 
commissioner (Dellinger 2006). 
 
For any given path of investment returns, a low AIR results in a relatively low level of initial 
benefit payments compensated by relatively much higher payments in later years and vice versa 
in the case of a high AIR. This pattern raises the question of potential self selection. People who 
have impaired health and a shorter than average life expectancy or who underestimate their 
expected longevity may prefer a higher AIR and thus higher initial payments, while people who 
have a longer than average life expectancy may opt for a lower AIR.  
 
In the United States, market practitioners suggest that providers do not use different mortality 
tables for different AIRs. They generally adopt more conservative mortality assumptions for all 
VPAs relative to fixed annuities, mainly because they lack the ability to use conservative 
                                                             
11 The participating 'guarantee and bonus' annuities that are used extensively in Denmark are often organized as 
deferred group annuities and resemble escalating participating annuities. Recent years have seen a large increase in unit-
linked policies but according to the regulatory authority these are used during the accumulation stage and convert to the 
traditional participating annuities at retirement. 
12 The mechanics of participating annuities are also discussed in Fowler (2010). 7 
 
investment assumptions to offset any under-estimation of longevity. One possible explanation for 
the lack of concern about potential adverse selection may well be the relatively low volume of 
VPA business. If demand for VPAs, i.e., if use of the annuitization option, were to increase to 
represent a large part of the business of providers, it is likely that policies would be adopted to 
prevent exposure to the adverse effects of self selection. 
 
A low AIR implies relatively low initial payments but allows future payments to keep pace with 
inflation. Thus, a variable payout annuity with a low AIR may achieve the same objective as a 
fixed escalating annuity. This implies that the AIR should be close to the long-term real rate of 
interest. An AIR that is significantly lower than this level would create distortions in the pattern 
of real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) benefit payments among annuitants with different longevity 
prospects, favoring long-lived individuals at the expense of short-lived ones. 
 
The choice of mortality table is a thorny issue in all types of annuity products. In general, 
annuity providers adopt conservative assumptions by factoring in projected improvements in 
mortality. They have a stronger incentive for this in contracts where they assume the longevity 
risk. It is notable that the Swedish Pensions Agency in Sweden uses a significantly more 
conservative mortality table for the calculation of the guaranteed benefits of the PPM 
participating annuities than it does for the benefit payments of both the unit-linked annuities and 
the regular payments of the participating annuities. 
 
2.3  The Setting of Benefit Payments in Subsequent Years 
 
Differences arise among the different types of annuities in the setting of subsequent benefit 
payments. Starting with the simpler and more transparent case, the standard unit-linked VPA, 
the annual payment in year t is equal to the annual payment in the preceding year (t-1) multiplied 
by the ratio of (1+RIR)(t-1)/(1+AIR).
13 The RIR (the realized investment rate of return by the 
relevant fund or funds)
14 is determined after deducting from gross investment income the charge 
for expenses and longevity risk. The charge is stipulated in the contract and providers are not 
allowed to increase it over the life of each unit-linked contract.
15 Providers are required to create 
a mortality fluctuation reserve and to make transfers from surplus to ensure its adequacy when 
longevity assumptions are exceeded. They are of course free to make transfers in the opposite 
direction when assumptions are overstated. Any overrun (or under-estimation) of expenses 
affects the profits of providers. If they are offered with guaranteed minimum rates of return or 
guaranteed minimum benefits, then these would be used to determine the annual benefit 
payments. The offer of guarantees is covered by fees that are included in the stipulated annual 
charge. Providers are required to incorporate in their reserves the need to cover their guarantees 
or to use appropriate hedging facilities for their risk exposure. 
 
The same approach in setting annual payments in subsequent years is also followed in CREF 
unit-linked annuities, but with one major difference. In CREF annuities the providers do not 
make a stipulated annual charge for expenses and longevity risk but are allowed to deduct from 
the gross investment income the actual expenses incurred in administering the contract as well as 
                                                             
13 The derivation of this simple formula is shown in Annex A.  
14 The RIR is the realized investment return by the relevant fund. It is not the market investment rate of return, 
which is given by the average return of all funds in the market. 
15 The charge for expenses and longevity risk may vary depending on the level of the AIR. 8 
 
regular adjustments for changes in longevity. The longevity adjustments are based on periodic 
estimates of longevity changes in the pool of annuitants that use a particular fund (relative to the 
longevity expectations factored in the setting of the initial benefit payments). Except for any 
guaranteed benefits, the providers do not bear the longevity risk, which is shared among all 
annuitants. The charges for expenses and longevity vary from year to year, affecting the net RIR 
and annuity payments. The providers are effectively allowed to make transfers from investment 
income to reserves to reflect changes in longevity. The CREF annuity represents an interesting 
approach to the treatment of longevity risk but it is notable that neither Canada nor the United 
Kingdom has authorized this type of annuity. 
 
The traditional participating annuities that are found in continental Europe follow a broadly 
similar approach. These policies are usually offered with guaranteed minimum benefits and 
declare annual bonuses based on the results of investment performance and longevity experience. 
A key variable for these policies is the profit sharing rule, which allocates annual profits between 
shareholders and policyholders. Once the profit allocated to policyholders is determined, it is 
used to calculate the bonus rate that is credited to policyholders and the share of profits that is 
placed in the collective bonus reserve. A smoothing mechanism is normally used in order to 
avoid wide fluctuations in the level of annual bonuses, but these mechanisms lack transparency 
and generate concerns about the equity and appropriateness of the bonus crediting policies of 
different providers.  
 
Escalating participating annuities aim to pay bonuses that increase at a more or less stable rate 
and incorporate such bonuses in the guaranteed benefits once they are declared. The initial 
payments are lower in these policies and the bonus rate is determined by taking into account the 
net investment performance and longevity experience of the fund as well as the need to build 
adequate reserves to enable the payment of rising guaranteed benefits. Annual bonuses may be 
suspended if net performance is very weak and threatens to undermine the adequacy of reserves. 
Such policies aim to replicate the benefits paid by fixed real annuities but without committing to 
do so. Because of this, they do not need to have access to an ample supply of inflation-linked 
securities. 
 
The PPM unit-linked annuities follow a different approach in calculating subsequent annual 
benefit payments. The Swedish Pensions Agency maintains individual accounts that record 
changes in account balances. The end-of-year (EOY) balance in any one year is equal to the 
beginning-of-year (BOY) balance less the benefit payments made during the year, plus 
investment income, less operating fees, plus survival credits. Survival credits in any one year are 
determined by multiplying the average account balance during the year (which is given by the 
BOY balance less half the benefit payments during the year) by the economic mortality risk for 
the year
16. Survival credits are given by the remaining balances in the accounts of deceased 
annuitants in any one year and for each age cohort. The BOY balance in the following year is 
divided by the new appropriate annuity factor to determine the annual benefits for that year. The 
annuity factor is based on the AIR, which may change from year to year, and expected mortality. 
The use of expected mortality protects pensioners in advanced ages from the declining cell 
numbers, while the small number of survivors does not affect the soundness of the program.  
 
                                                             
16 Half the annual benefits is taken into account because payments are made on a monthly basis. 9 
 
The posting of survival credits on individual accounts plays a crucial role in ensuring that the 
longevity risk is shared among annuitants on a cohort basis. Without them, PPM annuities would 
be similar to the lifetime phased withdrawals that have been authorized in Chile and other 
countries. A special feature of the PPM unit-linked annuities is that asset management is 
decentralized. Balances are allocated by annuitants to authorized investment funds (see Annex 
B). 
 
The PPM traditional participating annuities follow a similar approach as the unit-linked 
annuities, except that they also offer guaranteed minimum benefits and all balances are invested 
in one or more funds selected by the Swedish Pensions Agency. When the guarantees are 
activated, the minimum benefits are deducted from the accounts of the annuitants, which implies 
that annuitants pay for the guarantees with their own funds. When the balances are exhausted, 
the SPA assumes responsibility for paying the guaranteed benefits from its own funds. In 
computing the guaranteed minimum benefits, the SPA uses a lower interest rate than the AIR 
used for calculating the level of annual payments and also applies a more conservative mortality 
table. A weakness of this product as currently applied in Sweden is that the guaranteed minimum 
benefits are not adjusted for inflation.
17 The SPA creates reserves to cover its liability for the 
guaranteed benefits. 
3.  Advantages and Disadvantages of VPAs 
 
3.1  Advantages of VPAs 
 
VPAs  have several  advantages  over other types  of annuities. First  and foremost, they  allow 
participation in the normally higher, but more volatile, returns of equities and real assets. In 




Second, VPAs avoid the annuitization risk, i.e., the risk of retiring and purchasing annuities at an 
inopportune time when financial markets are depressed and the cost of fixed annuities is h igh. 
The timing of annuitization is a major concern for all types of fixed annuities. But in the case of 
VPAs, annuity payments vary with the performance of annuity funds and thus the prevailing 
conditions at the time of retirement do not have long-term implications.  
 
Third,  buyers  of  VPAs  may  not  suffer  from  the  wide  dispersion  of  annuity  prices  that 
characterize fixed annuities. Evidence from the United Kingdom shows that the range of quoted 
                                                             
17 The mechanics and performance of the two types of annuities offered by the PPM are discussed in much greater detail in 
Annex B. 
18 It is strongly argued by many financial economists and actuaries that despite the historical persistence of a 
sizable equity premium, risk-adjusted returns on equities are no higher than those on bonds. This argument is 
based on the postulate that the observed equity premium reflects the higher risk of equity returns. However, the 
equity premium may embody not only higher risk but also productivity gains of investments in real assets. This 
implies that the risk-adjusted returns on equities are higher than those on bonds, although not as high as the 
observed equity premium. It is also often argued that both the equity premium and the apparent mean or trend 
reversion of equity returns may reflect a survival bias for markets that are able to recover from major crises. 
Survival bias is clearly an important consideration. However, it does not favor investments in corporate or even 
government bonds because in countries where equity markets collapse and fail to recover or do so with a long and 
uncertain time lag, bond markets fare much worse. 10 
 
prices for fixed annuities may exceed 20 percent of average prices (Rocha and Vittas, 2010), 
while data on sold annuities in Chile point to similar conclusions (Rocha and Thorburn, 2007).  
 
Fourth, VPAs that share longevity risk among annuitants allow for a more balanced treatment of 
longevity risk because they do not have to rely on overly conservative assumptions about 
projected future mortality improvements. Longevity risk-sharing VPAs provide full protection 
against diversifiable longevity risk, i.e., the risk that any one annuitant may live much longer 
than the average, but share among surviving  annuitants the non-diversifiable risk, i.e., any 
increase in average longevity. 
 
Fifth, to the extent that providers do not assume the longevity, investment and inflation risks, 
VPAs  imply  smaller  capital  requirements  for  provider  solvency  and  thus  lower  the  cost  of 
annuities. 
 
3.2  Disadvantages of VPAs 
 
But VPAs also suffer from several shortcomings. Unlike holders of fixed real annuities, who are 
protected against longevity, investment and inflation risks, buyers of VPAs are exposed to 
investment and inflation risks and share the non-diversifiable component of longevity risk.  
 
Second, depending on how the initial calculation of annual payments is made, they may start 
with relatively low payments. This depends on the level of the AIR relative to the level of market 
returns  and  the  extent  of  projected  mortality  improvements  that  have  been  retained  in  the 
longevity assumptions. 
 
Third, depending on the volatility of annual returns on investment funds, annuity payments may 
fluctuate  widely  from  year  to  year.  These  fluctuations  may  cause  large  changes  in  the 
consumption patterns of pensioners. 
 
Fourth, VPAs presuppose access to well functioning and liquid securities markets. If they offer 
extensive guarantees, they also require access to efficient hedging facilities. 
 
Fifth, buyers of VPAs avoid the price dispersion of fixed annuities but they are exposed to the 
potential  dispersion  of  investment  performance,  expense  levels  and  bonus  smoothing 
mechanisms. 
 
Sixth, VPAs suffer from more complex charges that are both less transparent and more difficult 
to understand. Consumers often rely on the advice of brokers who have incentives to direct them 
to products and providers that offer the highest commissions. These create conflicts of interest 
situations, especially in markets where conduct regulation and supervision are weak. 
 
Seventh,  VPAs  may  also  suffer  from  opportunistic  cost  transfer  pricing  and  profit  sharing 
policies. Because they are less transparent and are more difficult to compare than fixed annuities, 
such practices may proliferate. 
 
Eighth, because of the way they handle longevity risk, some VPAs are exposed to potentially 
deceptive and even perverse marketing policies, affecting their risk-sharing arrangements. 11 
 
 
Ninth, VPAs require a very robust and effective system of regulation and supervision with high 
levels of transparency and integrity. Regulation and supervision should cover both prudential and 
conduct issues. Preventing opportunistic and deceptive practices is a difficult challenge. 
 
3.3  Exposure to Investment Risk 
 
Exposure to investment risk is real but its impact is often exaggerated. The risk of large losses 
and even financial ruin is present when annuity reserves are heavily invested in high-risk assets. 
A large and prolonged decline of asset prices may cause an early depletion of VPA balances. 
 
However, this risk is mitigated by the mean (or rather trend) reverting pattern of asset returns and 
the  dollar  cost  averaging  process  of  long-term  retirement  saving,  especially  when  the  latter 
applies to both its accumulation and decumulation phases. This is because accumulated balances 
are likely to be very high at the end of a prolonged strong performance of equities. While the 
probability of a prolonged decline in equity prices will then be high, accumulated balances will 
be  better  able  to  sustain  the  impact  of  falling  prices  without  suffering  catastrophic  erosion. 
Admittedly, mean or trend reversion does not occur with precise regularity and balances may 
suffer a significant decline before asset prices recover, but allowing for the dollar cost averaging 
process the probability of financial ruin is much smaller than is often argued.
19 
 
Exposure to investment risk can be further mitigated by investing in more stable asset 
allocations, although these would imply a lower expected return than in an all-equity portfolio. 
Since workers retiring at 65 have an average life expectancy of around 20 years and many will 
have a much longer retirement life, they may benefit from the higher returns of VPAs that have 
larger allocations in equities and real assets provided they have the required level of risk 
tolerance. 
 
Investment risk can also be contained by the offer of guaranteed minimum benefits and the use 
of floors and caps on asset returns. These entail a tradeoff between risk and return and their use 
should reflect the preferences and risk tolerance of annuitants. Although guarantees promise a 
more optimal combination of asset returns with adequate protection, they are difficult to price 
and even more difficult to regulate. Pensioners may be better off using a combination of fixed 




                                                             
19 The argument that dollar cost averaging reduces the risk of long-term investments suffers from the fallacy of time 
diversification. Any investment , whether in lump sum or installment form that has a given target date for its 
realization is exposed to the risk that market prices may be low at the target date. However, the risk exposure is 
different if both the accumulation and decumulation of retirement savings follows the dollar cost averaging process. 
Under such an approach, retirement saving is the very definition of time diversification. There is nothing fallacious 
about it. Of course, if retiring workers intend to use all or a large part of their accumulated savings to purchase fixed 
nominal or real annuities, they would be exposed to the risk of annuitization discussed above. They would then need 
to adopt policies to mitigate this risk, especially by following lifecycle investing strategies (e.g., increasing their 
allocations into long-term bonds, or purchasing annuities on an installment basis, as they near retirement). 
 
20 If fixed real annuities are not available, retiring workers can use a combination of escalating nominal annuities and 
VPAs without guarantees.  12 
 
A major concern is that annuity payments may fluctuate widely from year to year, causing large 
changes in the annual consumption patterns of retirees. However, most pensioners are not forced 
and are not likely to spend all their increased income when annuity payments are higher than 
average. Some of their increased retirement income may be saved and their consumption patterns 
may well prove to be more stable than their income. Another option used by providers in some 
countries is to allow annuitants, if they so wish, to withdraw smaller amounts in individual years. 
 
The exposure to investment risk and its potential adverse effects is a very strong argument against 
total reliance on VPAs. However, the presence of various mitigating factors suggests that they could 
be considered as part of a combination of payout options, especially in countries that can effectively 
address their regulatory and supervisory challenges. 
4.  Pricing and Reserving Policies of Participating Annuities 
 
This section discusses the regulation of pricing and reserving policies for the main types of 
participating annuities. The discussion focuses on the need for fair pricing policies that allow 
retiring workers to make informed decisions and are free from deceptive offers that exploit the 
lack of familiarity of workers with these complex products. (Section 6 on the regulation of 
marketing policies revisits the issue of deceptive practices.) The section addresses the case for 
regulating the various pricing features of different products and the burden that excessive 
regulation may place on market competition and product innovation. It also covers the regulation 
of reserving policies for these annuities with a view to ensuring the adequacy of technical 
reserves and the long-term financial soundness of providers. Two main principles are 
underscored: the need to protect the security of the retirement income of pensioners and the need 
to treat pensioners fairly. 
 
4.1  The Regulation of Pricing Policies of Traditional and Escalating Participating 
Annuities 
 
The regulation of pricing policies of traditional and escalating participating VPAs raises many 
complex issues and is particularly challenging in a competitive decentralized market. Strong 
competition among providers may lead to high initial payments that are then followed by low 
bonuses. To protect annuitants and avoid unstable situations, a cap is usually applied to the 
maximum AIR that can be used, even in countries that do not rely on quantitative restrictions. 
However, this practice is not universal; neither Canada nor the United Kingdom apply such a 
cap. 
 
In countries with less developed insurance markets, policymakers may well be inclined, even 
advised, to specify the calculation of initial benefit payments. This approach was proposed in 
Hungary in the 2009 stalled law on the design of the payout phase of the pension system. The 
proposal was motivated by the underdevelopment of insurance and annuity markets and the lack 
of familiarity of retiring workers with annuity products. Regulating the calculation of initial 
payments involves the stipulation of AIRs and mortality tables but also requires some rules on 
commission levels, surrender and operating charges, and profit participation rates. 
 
Setting the AIR. Countries that wish to regulate the calculation of initial benefit payments are 
inclined to stipulate low levels of AIRs for three main reasons: to allow for higher payments in 13 
 
later years and thus to make it easier for benefit payments to keep pace with inflation; to avoid 
situations where fluctuations in market rates cause frequent changes in regulated AIRs; and to set 
guaranteed benefits at a low level.  
 
The first two reasons have some validity, although care should be taken to avoid very low AIRs 
that cause significant distortions in the time pattern of benefit payments. In this respect, the 
stipulated zero percent AIR, which was proposed in the stalled Hungarian law of 2009, was 
probably overly restrictive (Vittas et al 2010). In general, a regulated AIR that is close to the 
long-term real rate of interest will probably be appropriate for calculating initial benefit 
payments and will allow sufficient room for future bonuses to cover the need for inflationary 
adjustments. In most countries, this should be in the range between 2 and 3 percent. 
 
The third reason, concerning the calculation of guaranteed benefits, does not seem to be valid. As 
shown by the Swedish PPM (see Annex B), guaranteed benefits do not need to be calculated in 
exactly the same way as initial benefit payments and can be based on a lower rate of interest as 
well as more conservative mortality tables. 
 
Mortality Tables. Specifying the calculation of initial payments also requires the stipulation of 
the mortality tables that should be used for this purpose. In general, the tables should be based on 
conservative assumptions with an allowance for future increases in longevity. The same tables 
should be specified for all providers.
21 Mortality tables should be updated regularly and should 
be based on the pool of annuitants rather than the general population.  
 
Historically, static period mortality tables, which did not allow for increases in longevity, were 
used even in advanced countries, while mortality tables were updated infrequently and were 
suffering from significant time lag. A common practice was to increase the age of policy holders 
by two years in the case of life insurance and to set it back by two years in the case of life 
annuities. Developing countries mainly used lagged mortality tables from the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Over the past two decades, however, insurance companies and pension 
funds have increasingly started to use dynamic cohort mortality tables that allow for projected 
improvements in mortality. And a growing number of middle-income countries have started to 
compile their own sets of mortality tables. 
 
In countries that are members of the European Union, the use of unisex mortality tables is 
compulsory for pricing purposes, at least for policies linked to occupational benefits. These have 
potentially adverse effects on different providers and may distort marketing policies. A 
compensation mechanism may be necessary to transfer reserves among providers. Such a 
mechanism was proposed in the stalled 2008 Polish law (see section 4.4 below). 
 
Guaranteed Benefits. The offer of guaranteed minimum benefits is a customary feature of 
participating annuities. If the other elements of VPAs are regulated, then the offer of guaranteed 
benefits should also be subject to regulation. The guaranteed benefits do not have to be equal to 
the initial benefits. As already noted, while the AIR for the calculation of initial benefits should 
                                                             
21 It is interesting to note that even absent such regulation, insurance companies in some high-income countries (e.g. 
Sweden) have adopted common mortality tables prepared by the association of insurance companies (Palmer 2008). 
Government regulation, especially if based on expert opinion, would not represent a major departure from current 
practice. 14 
 
ideally be close to the long-term real rate of interest, which in most countries would imply an 
AIR of between 2 and 3 percent, for the guaranteed benefits a zero rate of interest would be 
advisable. At the same time, a more conservative mortality table should be adopted than in 
calculating initial benefits. In this way, the guaranteed benefits would amount to between 70 and 
80 percent of initial benefits. In fact, regulators may stipulate that the guaranteed minimum 
benefits could not be lower than a specified percentage of initial benefits.  
 
Guaranteed benefits should ideally rise in line with inflation, since even moderate inflation 
would cause a significant erosion of their real value over a ten-year period and would have rather 
devastating effects over a longer period. Escalating participating annuities aim to provide such a 
link by targeting an annual bonus that equals the rate of inflation. However, the regulation should 
not require an automatic link to inflation unless providers have ample access to inflation-linked 
instruments that would allow them to hedge their risks. 
 
Rules on Profit Distribution. Market regulators need to ensure that annuity providers follow 
transparent and consistent policies on the distribution of profits between shareholders and 
annuitants. The policy of profit distribution of different providers is a crucial element of pricing 
policy. Together with the level of operating fees, the rate of profit sharing should be one of the 
most important criteria for selecting providers of variable payout annuities. 
 
Profit sharing rules are important for participating policies because providers are responsible for 
determining the level of distributable profits. The regulatory authorities may decide to set the 
minimum profit sharing rate as a means of protecting annuitants and ensuring their fair treatment 
with shareholders. In Poland and Hungary, the minimum profit participation rate was set in their 
respective stalled laws at 90 and 95 percent of annual profits.
22 When guaranteed benefits are 
offered, annuity providers are compelled to absorb any negative profits but are allowed to recoup 
their losses before determining profits available for distribution in subsequent years.  
 
Smoothing Mechanisms. A difficult issue for participating annuities concerns the smoothing of 
investment returns that is allocated to policyholders over time in an attempt to keep bonus rates 
stable and avoid large fluctuations in regular payments. This implies the creation of a so-called 
collective (or unallocated) bonus reserve. Providers should set out as clearly as possible their 
profit distribution and bonus reserve policies. 
 
In practice, however, smoothing mechanisms have suffered from a lack of transparency. The 
declaration of bonuses has been left to the discretion of managers and actuaries who have 
generally sought to attain stability in the pattern of annual bonuses, while ensuring the long-term 
solvency of providers. Because guaranteed rates were well below market rates for several 
decades before the late 1980s, there was little concern about the solvency of providers and their 
ability to honor their promises. The overall situation changed drastically in the 1990s as interest 
rates started to fall. It became critical in several countries in the first few years of the new 
millennium when both equity prices and interest rates fell to very low levels. In response to these 
developments, regulators in several countries modified their regulatory framework in favor of 
fair value accounting, regular stress testing, and greater transparency.  
 
                                                             
22 In Germany, the profit participation regulation stipulates three minimum rates: 90 percent of investment income; 75 
percent of risk surplus; and 50 percent of other operating surplus. 15 
 
Many academic studies have been undertaken in recent years in various countries to ascertain the 
smoothing mechanism used by providers of participating annuities. A common theme of these 
studies has been the high level of opacity on the part of providers. Researchers have made 
attempts to describe prevailing practices in different countries, have stipulated various smoothing 
models, and have tested empirically the relevance of the models and their welfare implications. 
However, little concrete evidence has been documented with regard to the actual policies 
pursued by different providers in different countries.
23 
 
A smoothing mechanism that could work well with escalating participating annuities would 
entail the following elements. The policies would start with relatively low initial benefits that 
would be set by using an AIR close to the long-term real rate of interest (in general, 2 or 3 
percent or even less if the long-term real rate of interest were lower than this level). They would 
also aim to declare regular bonuses that would increase at a rate that would be adequate in a low 
inflation country to maintain the real value of benefits. The annual result would reflect both 
investment performance and longevity experience and would allow for transfers to the reserves 
when increases in longevity exceed their expected level. When declared, the regular bonuses 
would be incorporated in the future guaranteed benefits. However, the regular bonuses would be 
suspended if the annual result was weak and the level of the collective bonus reserve was too 
low. 
 
A well-specified smoothing mechanism could be used to provide greater transparency while 
ensuring the adequacy of reserves and the long-term financial soundness of providers. For 
instance, a regular bonus that compensated fully for inflation would be declared if the collective 
bonus reserve equaled a specified percentage, say 20 percent, of technical provisions.
24 However, 
if the collective bonus reserve fell below, say, 10 percent of technical provisions, the regular 
bonus would be completely suspended, while if it fell in the range between 10 and 20 percent, 
the regular bonus would be adjusted on a pro rata basis relative to the rate of inflation. 
 
If the collective bonus reserve exceeded 20 percent of technical provisions, additional special 
bonuses could be declared. The smoothing mechanism would specify the period over which the 
excess might be distributed. These special bonuses would not be guaranteed and a strong case 
could be made for distributing them on a periodic basis, say once every three or five years. Such 
a smoothing mechanism would satisfy the need for greater disclosure and meaningful 
transparency, while preserving the ability of managers and actuaries to adjust bonus levels to 
financial and demographic conditions and ensure the adequacy of reserves and the long-term 
financial soundness of providers. 
 
Caps on Commissions and Operating Fees. High administrative costs are often incurred and 
large commissions are paid to agents and brokers as part of aggressive marketing campaigns to 
increase market share. Annuity providers amortize these costs over the longer run and charge 
high upfront commissions and operating fees as well as high surrender charges when switching is 
allowed. 
 
                                                             
23 A small sample of studies that has addressed these issues includes Grossen and Jorgensen (2000), Hansen and Miltersen 
(2002), Miltersen and Persson (2003), Ballotta et al (2006), and Cummins et al (2007).   
24 The Danish ATP seems to be using this level for determining its annual bonus rate (??). However, a different level 
may be selected by providers in different countries, depending on the volatility of investment returns. 16 
 
Annuity providers may also engage in cost transfer pricing whereby internal administrative and 
accounting services offered by another unit of a large group are billed at artificially high prices. 
Such practices benefit shareholders and lower the profits that could be allocated to policyholders. 
 
High operating costs depress the level of distributable profits. A high level of transparency is 
essential, while any cost transfer pricing should be subject to detailed scrutiny. Caps on 
commission rates and operating fees may be necessary, especially in countries with 
underdeveloped insurance and annuity markets, but care must be taken to allow for the cost of 
capital, including a reasonable rate of return, as well as for product innovation and operational 
flexibility.  
 
Caps should be subject to regular review, because there is a tendency in regulated markets for 
stipulated ceilings on commissions and operating fees to become the norm. The review should 
take into account the evolution of cost efficiency, product innovation and market sophistication. 
In fact, applied caps may need to be lowered over time in line with a general decrease in costs 
before they are eventually removed when the local markets reach an adequate level of 
sophistication and efficiency. The gradual decline in costs may result from a higher scale of 
operations, greater efficiency and a higher degree of market concentration. 
 
Asset management fees are not always transparent in participating annuities. Providers should be 
required to highlight the fees charged by different funds and also any fees involved when 
annuitants transfer balances between different funds. Unfortunately, individual investors and 
annuitants are not adequately responsive to differences in operating fees among providers as well 
as among funds. This allows some providers to earn high asset management fees that have an 
adverse effect on the level of annuity benefits. Imposing caps on asset management fees may be 




Switching. In traditional fixed life annuities, switching annuity provider is not permitted. Fixed 
life annuities are irrevocable and non-portable contracts. The irreversibility of annuity contracts 
is justified by the pricing of fixed life annuities, which is based on the projected life expectancy 
of the pool of annuitants at the time the contracts are issued and the then prevailing financial 
market returns. A loss of a contract because of switching would upset the actuarial and 
investment calculations of insurance companies and would require the levying of relatively hefty 
exit fees. 
 
However, the right to switch providers is increasingly seen as a legitimate consumer right. If this 
is  allowed,  the  regulators  would  need  to  stipulate  clear  rules  on  the  valuation  of  portable 
balances, the share of transferors in the collective (unallocated) bonus reserve, and the levying of 
exit fees. Estonia has included a switching right in its 2009 law on the payout phase. To guard 
against adverse marketing effects and discourage excessive focus on low-risk annuitants, the 
regulations require annuity providers to use the same guaranteed interest rates, mortality tables 
and operating fees for all the annuities they provide on the same day. Annuity providers would 
not  be  allowed  to  discriminate  among  annuitants  on  the  basis  of  health  status.
25  Yet, this 
approach would prevent the offer of more advantageous terms to people with impaired health. 
 
Switching may  expose pensioners of advanced age to unscrupulous pressure by predatory 
brokers and providers inclined to take advantage of the declining mental ability of older persons. 
Thus, while switching may control some abuses by brokers and providers with regard to younger 
retirees, special safeguards would be required to protect the interests of persons of advanced 
age.
26 This is a good example of the complexity of marketing and pricing policies raised by 
                                                             
25 See Vittas et al (2010) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
26 I am indebted to Mark Fowler for this important observation as well as for several other insightful comments 
that have been incorporated in this paper.   
Box 2: The Scandal of Mis-Selling Personal Pensions in the United Kingdom 
 
When personal pension plans were authorized in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, no requirement was 
imposed on providers to ensure that transferring from an occupational to a personal pension scheme was in the 
best interests of the employees. This led directly to the personal pensions mis-selling scandal that erupted in 
December 1993.  
 
Between 1988 and 1993, 500,000 members of occupational pension schemes had transferred their assets to 
personal pension schemes following high pressure sales tactics by agents of PPS providers. As many as 90 
percent of those who transferred had been given inappropriate advice. Miners, teachers, nurses and police 
officers were among the main targets of the sales agents. Many of these people remained working for the same 
employer, but they switched from a good occupational pension scheme offering an index-linked pension into a 
PPS towards which the employer did not contribute and which took 25 percent of the transfer value in 
commissions and administration charges.  
 
An example reported in the press concerned a miner who transferred to a PPS in 1989 and retired in 1994 aged 
60. He received a lump sum of £2,576 and a pension of £734 by his new scheme. Had he remained in his 
occupational scheme, he would have received a lump sum of £5,125 and a pension of £1,791. The poor miner 
lost 50 percent of his lump sum and 60 percent of his pension. As a result of a public outcry, PPS providers have 
had to compensate those who had been given inappropriate advice to the tune of £11 billion. 
 
Source: Blake (2001:6) 
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variable payout annuities. The infamous mis-selling scandal of personal pensions in the United 
Kingdom in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Box 2) adds credence to this concern. 
 
The right to switch annuity providers is a useful consumer protection feature when providers 
make drastic changes in their marketing policies or are involved in mergers with other companies 
with very different risk profiles (see further discussion in section 6). In these circumstances, any 
exit fees should be suspended in order to allow undeterred switching. In addition, rules should be 
adopted to ensure that exit fees are not excessive and that portable balances are not subject to 
improper valuations. 
 
Box 3: The Regulation of Profit Sharing in Denmark 
 
In Denmark, the insurance companies and pension funds that offer profit participating annuities are required to submit 
to  the  supervisor  an  annual  notification  indicating  their  policy  of  profit  distribution  between  policyholders  and 
shareholders, essentially by setting out the rules and assumptions for the calculation of the part of the annual result that 
accrues to their equity.  This is often  a focus of attention in the media and an important parameter  affecting the 
competitive  environment  among  the  companies.  In  order  to  improve  market  transparency  and  comparability,  the 
supervisor has issued a guidance on this topic. Providers do not have to comply with the guidelines but if they do the 
supervisor will be less likely to ask for additional explanations. 
 
In the notification, each institution must divide the equity's part of the result into one part related to the return on 
equity, which is normally equal to the return offered to policyholders, and one part reflecting the extent of the risk 
incumbent on equity. It must also explain the rationale for the particular allocation. The notification must be in place 
before the beginning of the accounting year. Among other things it must specify how much extra return could be 
awarded  to  the  insured  if  the  equity  was  not  rewarded  with  a  risk  premium.  The  company  must  classify  the 
assumptions behind the calculation of the risk premium into: risks which are not specific to the company in question, 
such as financial risks, biometric risks and risks relating to cost assumptions; and risks related to the business plan of 
the specific company, such as its investment strategy and reinsurance program. 
 
A company is not allowed to change the principles and assumptions governing the calculation of the risk premium 
during the year but has the right to change its policy when the notification to the supervisor must be renewed. No later 
than eight days after board approval of the annual distribution of profits between policyholders and shareholders, the 
providers must notify the supervisor as to the actual risk premium awarded to equity. Hence, the expected and actual 
risk premium to equity can be compared and any difference explained. The notification must also specify the amount 
of the equity risk premium that will not be transferred to the equity capital because the annual result is not expected to 
be sufficient. A larger part to owners than to policyholders may only be distributed to own funds, when this larger part 
plus the amounts distributed to the insurance portfolio can be covered by the result for the year. If the result for the 
year is not sufficient to allow distribution to own funds, the shortfall is recorded in a shadow account and is recovered 
from future profits. 
 
The aim of this regulation is not to establish maximum ceilings on the risk premium to be allocated to shareholders, 
but to force the management to consider the risks facing equity holders and thus ensure that the remuneration of both 
policyholders and shareholders is fair and based on clearly specified criteria. The supervisor compiles and publishes an 
annual comparative table on the extra return that could be awarded to policyholders if the equity was not rewarded 
with a risk premium. This provides some indication of the comparative performance of different providers. However, 
to be fully satisfactory, the table should also include data on the level of operating costs of different providers and the 
returns obtained by policyholders. The complexity of products and the great variation in the terms and conditions of 
the multitude of collective labor agreements has impeded the compilation of such a comprehensive database, although 
it can also be argued that the presence of labor market associations, representing both workers and employers, may 
have  reduced  the  need  for  it.  Whatever  the  reason,  the  market  suffers  from  the  lack  of  completely  meaningful 
transparency. 
 
Source: Danish FSA, Andersen and Skjodt (2007). 19 
 
Flexible Regulation. A tight regulation along the preceding lines would introduce considerable 
rigidity  in  the  management  of  traditional  and  escalating  participating  VPAs.  Such  rigid 
regulation is not generally recommended since it may well cause competitive distortions and 
impede  product  innovation.  It  is  only  envisaged  as  a  temporary  solution  for  countries  with 
underdeveloped insurance and financial markets. A more flexible alternative is to allow annuity 
providers to determine their initial benefit payments and their own profit distribution policies and 
smoothing mechanisms but to require a high level of meaningful transparency.  
 
This is the approach that is followed in Denmark (see Box 3), although it does not appear to 
address fully the need for meaningful transparency. In addition to requiring formal notification of 
profit-sharing policies, the Danish FSA compiles an annual table with data on the impact on 
policyholder returns of the equity risk premium awarded by each provider to its equity capital. 
This is a step in the right direction for countries where integrity risk is under effective control, 
although more needs to be done to ensure adequate transparency and comparability. In particular, 
the table should also include data on the level of operating costs of different providers and the 
returns obtained by policyholders. 
 
Many other OECD countries, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, also do not impose minimum profit participation rates. In the 
United Kingdom, the FSA imposes a general duty on providers to treat customers fairly and also 
requires providers to publish their Principles and Practices of Financial Management (PPFM). 
But the FSA does not compile any data on the extent to which providers comply with these 
requirements or on the relative performance of different providers. There is also no indication of 
the practical usefulness of PPFMs. The PPFM of the British Prudential is posted on its website, 
runs for no less than 48 pages, and is completely incomprehensible. This is an example of futile 
transparency. 
 
4.2  The Regulation of Reserving Policies of Traditional and Escalating Participating 
  Annuities 
 
Maintaining adequate reserves is essential for ensuring the ability of annuity providers to meet 
their obligations toward pensioners. However, reserving policies are complicated by the offer of 
guaranteed minimum benefits and the use of complex smoothing mechanisms. 
 
Providers of variable payout annuities are required to maintain separate reserve accounts for their 
VPA business (participating or unit-linked) and their fixed annuities. Traditionally, the accounts 
of providers were based on book values or amortized cost but increasingly accounting standards 
require the use of fair value accounting which implies the use of market values for actively 
traded assets and model valuations for illiquid and infrequently traded assets.  
 
To determine the required level of reserves, best estimates of future benefits are first projected by 
assuming that the future realized investment rate of return (RIR) is equal to the AIR and are also 
adjusted for changes in longevity. The longevity adjustment is based on gender-specific 
mortality projections (even if unisex tables are used for pricing and benefit-setting purposes) and 
may take place on a periodic basis when it becomes apparent that observed mortality is 
significantly different (usually smaller) from what has already been assumed and built into the 
reserves. Future benefits are then discounted to the present at the AIR. This implies that if there 20 
 
are no changes in longevity the required reserves will be equal to the outstanding balances of 
annuity assets.  
 
Second, the future minimum guaranteed benefits are projected, again using gender-specific 
mortality tables instead of the unisex tables that are used for pricing purposes. These are then 
discounted to the present by using an appropriate market-based discount rate. Providers are 
required to maintain reserves to the higher of the two calculated levels. 
 
If the guaranteed benefits are not based on high rates of interest relative to market rates, the first 
calculation would be the operative one. Discounting guaranteed benefits by a market-based 
maturity-dependent discount rate would effectively treat them as fixed liabilities, which they are, 
and would require an amount of assets to be invested in fixed income bonds of matching duration 
or to be hedged through the use of derivatives, such as interest rate swaps. The size of such 
matching assets would depend on the level of market rates of interest and their relationship to the 
rate of interest used in computing the guaranteed minimum benefits. If the guaranteed benefits 
are calculated with a low rate of interest, this approach would require a smaller proportion of 
reserves to be invested in matching assets and would allow a higher proportion of assets to be 
available for investment in equities and other higher-yielding assets than if the reserves for the 
guaranteed benefits are also calculated at the AIR. 
 
Thus, the regulations on reserving policies for traditional participating annuities need to draw a 
clear distinction between the total reserves and the part of the reserves that are required to cover 
the guaranteed minimum benefits. Even if the AIR is stipulated by regulation to be equal to zero, 
allowing the reserves for the guaranteed benefits to be discounted at market rates would provide 
scope for a more flexible asset allocation strategy and for improved investment performance.  
 
When providers use well established smoothing mechanisms for the declaration of bonuses, 
annuitants may develop reasonable expectations for such future bonuses. The regulators may 
then require the maintenance of reserves that cover not only the formally guaranteed minimum 
benefits but also the expected future bonuses. In such cases, providers would be required to 
maintain reserves to the higher of the outstanding balances of annuity assets and the present 
value of the sum of guaranteed benefits and expected future bonuses. 
 
This approach to reserving policies is essential for the escalating participating annuities, in which 
regular bonuses are incorporated in the guaranteed benefits once they are declared and in which a 
rising level of guaranteed benefits is an integral feature of their benefit structure. The reserving 
policies should reflect the targeted rate of regular bonuses. 
 
4.3  Pricing and Reserving Policies of PPM Participating Annuities 
 
The pricing and reserving policies are much simpler for the PPM participating annuities that are 
offered in Sweden (see section 2 above as well as Annex B). The basic characteristics of these 
annuities is that the longevity risk is shared among annuitants on an age cohort basis, while no 
smoothing mechanism is used, i.e., 100 percent of profits after the deduction of expenses is 
distributed each year. 
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On the pricing front, there is a need to specify the AIR for the annual benefit payments and the 
lower rate of interest that is used to calculate the guaranteed minimum benefits. The specification 
of appropriate mortality tables is also essential, especially because the longevity risk is shared 
among annuitants on an age cohort basis. 
 
When this type of  annuity is offered by a single public agency, there is less concern about 
deceptive pricing policies and perverse marketing initiatives (see section 6). However, the offer 
of such annuities in a competitive decentralized market may raise serious regulatory and 
supervisory challenges since it would be very difficult to verify that providers do not resort to 
deceptive or perverse practices. The right to switch provider without incurring undue transferring 
expenses would then be of crucial importance. 
 
The reserving policies for the PPM participating annuities also involve a simpler approach since 
all profits are distributed each year and the Swedish Pensions Agency does not use a smoothing 
mechanism. The reserves are equal to the outstanding balances on individual accounts plus the 
present value of the cost of guaranteed benefits for the small number of accounts that might 
exhaust their balances and require payments to be made by the SPA. Because the reserves are 
invested in a stable-value portfolio, the AIR used for calculating annual benefit payments is 
reasonably low, the guaranteed benefits are a prudent fraction of initial annual payments, and 
SPA payments start after the account balances have been exhausted, the actuarial cost of the 
guarantees and the required additional reserves are likely to be very small. 
 
4.4  Reserving Policies and the Compulsory Use of Unisex Mortality Tables 
 
An  important  reserving  issue  is  raised  in  many  countries  by  the  compulsory  use  of  unisex 
mortality tables.
27 This rule is likely to create marketing distortions , linked to  the significant 
difference in the life expectancy of men and women and the likely tendency of annuity providers 
to target male retirees.  One way to mitigate this distortive effect is to  require the purchase of 
joint life annuities by both working spouses.  
 
An additional measure to help overcome the adverse effects of this rule and to protect providers 
with high-risk annuitants is to require annuity providers to calculate their technical reserves on 
both gender-specific and unisex mortality tables and to introduce a mechanism for making 
compensatory transfers among providers. Such a compensating mechanism was contemplated in 
the stalled Polish law of 2008 (Vittas et al 2010).  
 
4.5  Are Escalating Participating Annuities Appropriate for Developing Countries? 
 
This is a question that permeates the writing of this paper. Escalating participating annuities have 
several advantages. They provide a guaranteed floor for annual benefits and allow participation 
in higher returns. Although they do not protect fully against inflation risk, they aim to increase 
benefits in line with inflation, if not in every single year, at least over the life of the annuity. 
When basic bonuses are declared, they are incorporated into the guaranteed minimum benefits, 
which therefore keep pace with inflation. They are in this respect superior to fixed nominal 
                                                             
27 This reflects an EU Directive that stipulates that men and women should receive equal access to goods and 
services. The implementation of this rule on pensions and annuities linked to occupational benefits implies that 
providers are not entitled to use gender risk as a factor for pricing annuities. 22 
 
annuities, which provide no protection against inflation, a defect that may harm long-lived 
individuals. And unlike fixed real annuities, they do not require access to an ample supply of 
inflation-linked securities. 
 
Escalating participating annuities also have some advantages over other VPAs. Because they aim 
to declare bonuses that grow at a stable rate and are included in the guaranteed benefits once they 
are  declared,  they  tend  to  invest  predominantly  in  medium-term  government  and  corporate 
bonds. As a result, they are exposed to moderate investment risk. Their returns are also likely to 
be moderate but their main attraction in addition to the low exposure to investment risk is that 
they avoid the annuitization risk of fixed annuities, provide better protection against inflation risk 
than fixed or escalating nominal annuities, and can replicate the benefits of fixed real annuities 
without requiring access to an ample supply of inflation-linked securities.  
 
Their main shortcoming is the use of opaque smoothing mechanisms and concomitant lack of 
meaningful transparency. This gives rise to significant regulatory and supervisory challenges. 
Annuitants are exposed to investment risk and the nondiversifiable component of longevity risk. 
But of even greater importance is their exposure to the solvency and integrity risks of annuity 
providers.  
 
Insurance companies that are likely to be the main providers of participating annuities in most 
countries engage almost everywhere in practices that undermine public trust (see section 6 and 
Box 4 below), especially in weak or ineffective regulatory regimes. Such practices may cover 
several areas, including marketing and selling techniques, pricing policies, cost transfer pricing 
methodologies, unfair profit sharing policies, and opaque smoothing mechanisms. 
 
These problems caution against the use of escalating participating policies or any other VPAs for 
the payout phase of mandatory funded pension pillars of developing countries that lack the 
capacity to create robust regulatory and supervisory systems. This position is reinforced by the 
availability of an alternative approach that entails the positive elements of participating annuities 
while avoiding their most questionable features. 
 
This alternative approach would involve the offer of fixed real annuities or, in their absence, 
escalating nominal annuities in combination with either phased withdrawals or unit-linked 
annuities without any guarantees. Under this approach, retiring workers could be allowed to 
invest between 70 and 100 percent of their account balance
28 in a fixed real or an escalating 
nominal annuity that would offer annual benefits that increase at a specified rate (say, 2 percent). 
This would provide a guaranteed income with either full or some protection against inflation. At 
the same time, retiring workers would be allowed to invest up to 30 percent of their balances in a 
phased withdrawal account or in a unit-linked annuity without any guarantees. They could invest 
these balances in a small number of underlying funds of their choice, reflecting their income 
objectives and their level of risk tolerance. The longevity risk of the fixed real annuity or the 
escalating nominal annuity would be assumed by the annuity provider but that of the unit-linked 
annuity would be shared among all annuitants, while in the case of the phased withdrawal 
account it would be borne by the pensioner. 
                                                             
28 The 70 percent threshold is indicative. Individual countries may opt for a higher or lower level, depending on the 
availability of a basic public pension.  If the latter is significant, a higher proportion of balances could be invested in 
in higher return (higher risk) unit-linked annuities. 23 
 
 
Fixed real annuities and escalating nominal annuities would be exposed to annuitization risk, i.e., 
the risk that at the time of retirement asset prices and/or long-term rates of interest are 
abnormally low. This risk can be mitigated by purchasing annuities on an instalment basis over a 
period of five to ten years. In contrast, escalating participating annuities would avoid this risk but 
they would require the creation of a robust and agile regulatory and supervisory framework, a 
requirement that policymakers in developing countries would find difficult to satisfy. 
5.  Pricing and Reserving Policies of Unit-Linked VPAs 
 
5.1  The Regulation of Pricing Policies of Unit-Linked Annuities 
 
The pricing policies of the standard unit-linked VPAs without any guarantees raise regulatory 
issues that are much less complex than those of participating annuities. This is because they 
distribute 100 percent of net investment income and are generally more transparent. They charge 
an explicit fee for administrative expenses and longevity risk. This is stipulated in the contract 
and is deducted from investment income. The level of asset management fees for individual 
investment funds may raise concerns if they are significantly higher than those applied by 
independent mutual funds, especially because policyholders face stiff surrender charges if they 
decide to transfer their business to other providers. 
 
The regulators could specify the AIR and mortality tables that can be used for calculating initial 
payments and they could apply caps on operating fees, broker commissions and surrender 
charges. But because the authorization of unit-linked annuities presupposes the presence of 
reasonably well-developed financial markets, such detailed regulations are not usually applied. 
However, as already noted above, to avoid excessive competition and ensure that adequate 
reserves are maintained, a maximum cap is often, but not always, imposed on the level of the 
AIR. No such cap is applied in Canada and the United Kingdom. 
 
In unit-linked annuities, greater emphasis is placed on meaningful disclosure and transparency. 
These cover not only the level of explicit fees, but also the asset management fees of investment 
funds in which balances can be invested, fees for transfers between funds, surrender charges, and 
fees for guaranteed minimum benefits, if they are offered. 
 
Increasingly, unit-linked VPAs are offered with guaranteed payout annuity floors (GPAFs). 
The guaranteed payment is based on an annuity conversion rate (or factor) that is usually 
calculated with a low AIR and a conservative mortality table. The stipulated conversion rate may 
be applied to the value of the underlying account at retirement or the ratchet value during 
retirement, given by the highest account value attained on a contract anniversary date. 
Restrictions are normally imposed on asset allocations to prevent investments in highly risky 
assets. Annuitants may be limited to select among stable-value funds with larger allocations in 
government and corporate bonds relative to equities, while periodic rebalancing among selected 
funds may also be required.  
 
Providers include the guarantee fee in their stipulated total annual charges, attaining a reasonable 
degree of transparency. But providers retain the flexibility to raise the asset management fees on 
the selected investment funds, lowering net investment returns and the value of the guarantees. 24 
 
The pricing of these guarantees is highly complex and reflects the cost of hedging, which in turn 
depends on the volatility of investment returns on the selected funds. Sudden, abrupt increases in 
volatility which occur at times of declining market prices and low liquidity cause a substantial 
increase in the cost of hedging and often force providers to suspend the offer of VPAs with 
guaranteed payout benefits. 
 
CREF and PPM unit-linked VPAs raise even fewer regulatory issues on pricing policies, other 
than the paramount importance of transparency. The charges that are made for expenses and 
longevity changes need to be disclosed and to be supported by sound justification. In addition, 
any changes in the basic parameters, such as the AIR and the mortality tables, should be 
communicated to annuitants in a clear and comprehensible manner. The PPM unit-linked 
annuities as currently offered do not include guaranteed minimum benefits. This simplifies 
pricing and reserving decisions but transfers the investment risk to annuitants. The public or 
semi-public nature of the providers of these annuities implies a strong need for effective control 
of governance structures and a strong commitment to a high level of integrity. 
 
5.2  The Regulation of Reserving Policies of Unit-Linked Annuities 
 
Reserving policies are very easy for the PPM unit-linked annuities, where the liabilities are 
always equal to the value of the remaining assets on each account. Since the providers bear 
neither investment nor longevity risk, there is no need for any supplementary reserves. Future 
benefits will be determined by the future value of assets. This is equivalent to projecting benefits 
by assuming that the RIR will be equal to the AIR and discounting future benefits by the AIR. 
Expected mortality is reflected in the annuity divisor that is used each year to calculate annual 
benefit payments. The counter side to all this is that annuitants bear the investment risk as well as 
the nondiversifiable component of the longevity risk. 
 
Asset valuation is based on market prices and since the assets are invested in authorized mutual 
funds, they reflect the daily market prices (net asset values) of those funds. There could be some 
problems with the valuation of particular assets held by the various mutual funds, say holdings of 
mortgage-backed securities that have become illiquid. These could have an adverse effect on net 
asset values and could depress the benefits of annuitants but they would not require the setting 
aside of any reserves by either the managers of the affected mutual funds nor the Swedish 
Pensions Agency. 
 
Broadly similar considerations apply to the case of the CREF annuities as well as the standard 
unit-linked VPAs without any guarantees. A main difference is that in the standard unit-linked 
VPAs the mortality risk is assumed by the providers. In addition to projecting future benefits at 
the AIR and the assumed mortality table and then discounting back to the present by the AIR, the 
providers are required to create a mortality fluctuation reserve to cover future deviations between 
observed and assumed mortality. This is usually a relatively small reserve because providers use 
conservative mortality tables and future deviations are unlikely to be very large. 
 
In contrast, reserving policies for VPAs with guaranteed payout annuity floors (GPAFs) are 
highly complex. The offer of GPAFs transforms unit-linked VPAs from being one of the least 
risky annuities from the perspective of providers to one of the most risky. This is because a very 
large part of investment risk is borne by the providers rather than the annuitants as in the version 25 
 
without guarantees. Providers should either hedge their exposure to the increased investment risk 
through the use of complex derivatives and dynamic hedging programs or hold increased 
reserves. Specifying the required level of reserves is extremely difficult and regulators 
increasingly adopt a principles- rather than a rules-based approach in the setting of reserves. 
However, ensuring that providers are properly hedged or adequately reserved remains a big 
challenge. Given the high risks of these products for providers, the difficulty of ensuring the 
soundness of providers, and the ample scope for market manipulation, the offer of VPAs with 
guaranteed payout benefits should not be contemplated in countries that do not have well 
developed and efficient insurance and financial markets, including hedging facilities.  
6.  The Regulation of Marketing Policies of VPAs 
 
6.1  Exposure to Integrity Risk 
 
All types of annuities are exposed to integrity risk, i.e. the risk that providers will engage in 
deceptive practices with harmful effects on the interests of annuitants. Such practices are often 
promoted by small print conditions, improper marketing policies, and opaque pricing decisions. 
However, the exposure to integrity risk is much greater in the case of VPAs because pricing 
decisions are made throughout the life of annuitants. For this reason, exposure to integrity risk is 
particularly pronounced in the case of people of advanced age.  
 
Integrity risk is similar to bankruptcy risk in that annuitants suffer losses because of 
inappropriate behavior by providers. In the case of insolvency, inappropriate behavior covers 
lack of prudence and excessive risk taking and even outright fraud. Bankruptcy risk is addressed 
by strengthening prudential regulation and supervision and taking early remedial action. 
Effective protection may also be provided through government guarantees. 
 
But integrity risk differs from bankruptcy risk in that it does not entail the failure and closure of 
annuity providers. Deceptive practices may target individual groups of annuitants and may be 
pursued for long periods before they are detected and action is taken to correct and deter them. 
This is a problem that affects all types of insurance operations and is related to the widespread 
use of opaque contracts with a plethora of small print conditions and exclusions. Deceptive 
practices are often the result of competitive pressures in decentralized markets (see Box 4) but 
they also reflect excessive preoccupation with maximizing short-term profits and the executive 
compensation that is linked to them. 
 
The regulation of marketing policies plays an important role in protecting annuitants from 
deceptive practices. It needs of course to be supported with effective regulation of pricing and 
reserving policies. However, the regulation of marketing policies is a difficult challenge in 
decentralized competitive markets. The selling of life annuities requires considerable marketing 
effort by insurance companies and deployment of brokers and agents in explaining the relative 
advantages of life annuities over lump sums and phased withdrawals. Brokers tend to have 
strong incentives to influence the decision to annuitize and derive considerable benefits from 
channeling retiring workers to providers who offer the highest commissions and not necessarily 
the best prices and returns to annuitants. 




    Box 4: Practices that Undermine Public Trust 
 
Insurance companies in both advanced and developing countries often engage in practices that undermine public trust. 
One example that is widespread in insurance markets in less developed countries is the offer of very low premiums for, 
say, motor insurance, by small companies that are usually weakly capitalized. Such practices are accompanied by failure 
to  maintain  adequate  reserves,  involvement  in  protracted  disputes  and  long  delays  in  settling  claims,  and  eventual 
insolvency, leaving government regulators to sort out the mess of outstanding claims. Strengthening prudential regulation 
and supervision can play an important role in protecting policyholders from such unscrupulous insurers.  
 
In advanced countries, in addition to the mis-selling saga in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s (see Box 1), the 
following three examples from the US market underscore this issue. First, in marketing term life insurance, American 
insurance companies stress that policyholders will not be required to undergo annual medical tests after the initial health 
screening. It is clarified that annual premiums will increase to reflect the growing mortality risk of aging individuals but 
subject to prescribed ceilings and will not reflect any deterioration in the health status of the insured. However, as 
premiums increase over time, policyholders are continuously targeted with new offers that have more attractive terms but 
require voluntary medical screening. Policyholders who do not respond to such marketing offers are deemed to be bad 
risks and are subjected to relatively large increases in premiums (within the prescribed ceilings, which are specially 
designed to allow for such increases). Many policyholders do not renew their policies when they realize how much more 
they are being asked to pay but insurers do not mind the non-renewal because these policies become loss making over 
time. The deception lies in the false reassurance given to prospective policyholders that they will not be subject to future 
annual medical tests and their annual premiums will not reflect their health status. Insurance companies are forced by 
marketing campaigns from their competitors to bombard their clients with new offers but they exploit their competitive 
advantage over other insurers in that they already have a contractual relationship with their targeted clients. 
 
Second, in a recently revealed but long-standing practice, life insurance companies, apparently including some of the 
largest names, such as Metropolitan Life (which devised it in the mid-1980s) and Prudential Financial, have adopted the 
policy of not sending the funds to recipients of death benefits but instead placing them in so-called retained-asset accounts 
and forwarding a checkbook to recipients, which they can use to draw the funds over time. The letter to recipients presents 
this as a convenient and safe means to hold their balances, allowing them time to decide how to use the funds. However, 
the communication does not indicate that the funds are not placed in a proper bank account. A disclosure is usually made 
in small print that the accounts are not covered by the federal deposit insurance guarantee. The rate of interest paid on 
these retained-asset accounts is in most cases below competitive levels available on comparable bank accounts (although 
reportedly the TIAA-CREF paid in 2009 the relatively very high rate of 4 percent (Leondis, 2010)). The funds are held in 
the general corporate account of the insurers rather than in segregated accounts and are invested in government and 
corporate bonds, earning returns that increase the profits of insurers. The practice has attracted considerable criticism 
because it has affected the families of deceased soldiers (Evans 2010) but it has been applied to policies covering both 
members of the military and employees of the federal government. Neither state insurance regulators nor representatives 
of the federal government had until recently objected to this practice. 
 
The third example concerns the practice of contract rescissions (cancellations) that has been widely applied by health 
insurance companies in their individual policies to people who suffer from serious illnesses. This practice was highlighted 
during the protracted and contentious public debate on health care reform in the US. It allegedly involved health insurers 
employing large contingents of staff with the remit to engage in so-called 'post-claims underwriting' in order to identify 
reasons  for  which  the  contracts  could  be  cancelled  for  alleged  violations  committed  during  the  application  process. 
Because the practice denied or delayed coverage to people with serious health problems it generated considerable criticism 
and led to its prohibition under the new health care legislation that was enacted in 2010. However, the new act will be 
implemented over the next few years and it remains to be seen how effective the implementing regulations will be in 
preventing such abuses by health insurance companies. The new law allows contract cancellations only if insurance fraud 
is committed. In general, state insurance regulation has not required the compilation of statistical data on the use of 
contract rescissions by health insurers. 
 
Unfortunately, as in the case of retained-asset accounts and the marketing of term life insurance, state insurance regulators 
have been acquiescent to the use of these practices by insurers and have failed to protect the interests of consumers. It is 
unfortunate that because insurance regulation is not a federal responsibility, the new Consumer Financial Protection Board 
that has been set up to prevent abusive practices in banking, credit card, and mortgage finance business will not also cover 
the insurance sector. 27 
 
 
The regulatory issues cover the stipulation of basic conduct rules, the creation of a centralized 
database, the regulation of broker commissions, the prevention of deceptive pricing practices, 
and the prohibition of perverse marketing campaigns.  
 
6.2  Basic Conduct Rules 
 
The first requirement of an effective regulation of marketing in a decentralized competitive 
market is compliance with basic conduct rules, such as the „know-your-customer‟ rule and an 
adequate disclosure of the terms and conditions of different products. However, because life 
annuity products are highly complex, there is also a need for extensive training of agents and 
brokers. In addition to adequate training, brokers need to pass a certification test as well as the 
standard „fit and proper‟ test. Licensed brokers must be legally obligated to represent their 
clients, must generate their income from commissions on the sale of annuities, and must not be 
permitted to accept volume-related remuneration from insurers. 
 
6.3  Creation of Centralized Databases 
 
Adopting a centralized electronic quotation system, such as the one introduced in Chile in 2004 
(Rocha and Thorburn, 2007; Reyes and Stewart, 2008), merits serious consideration. This is a 
centralized service that compiles and validates individual data on retiring workers and solicits 
quotes from participating institutions. Such a system reduces the influence of brokers, lowers the 
search costs of retiring workers, enhances the quality of information available to them, and 
ensures broad access to competitively-priced annuities. 
 
An electronic quotation system is essential in the case of fixed nominal or real annuities as well 
as escalating annuities, but it can also be useful for all kinds of variable payout annuities. It can 
facilitate the comparability of different offers and underscore the various types of guaranteed 
benefits and the charges that are levied for each type of benefit. 
 
However, to strengthen competition in the market for variable payout annuities, the central 
register should also compile comparative data on a consistent and informative basis on the 
performance and bonus policies of different providers. This will enhance the transparency of the 
system. The register should focus on key aspects of pricing policies and performance, such as 
profit-sharing rules, levels of operating costs and fees, commission fees and surrender charges, 
and consistency and soundness of investment policies rather than on a mere reporting of past 
performance data. At the same time, annuitants should be encouraged to select providers with 
diversified investment portfolios, a consistent record of sound performance, low operating fees, 
and high profit participation rates. Focusing on recent past performance, which is often 
underscored by selling agents, is not sound practice since past returns are not good predictors of 
future performance. 
 
A central register along these lines is easier to operate for participating policies where the 
number of factors that need to be followed is relatively small. It is a much greater challenge in 
the case of US-style variable annuities with their wide range of guarantees. In recent years 
various websites have been created that compile such data. What is needed is effective regulatory 28 
 
oversight to ensure that the various websites are objective and impartial in the data they collect 
and publicize. 
 
It is interesting to note that neither Denmark nor Sweden, two countries where participating 
annuities are widely used, has a central register compiling performance data on a systematic 
basis. In both countries, the offer of such annuities is based on broad collective labor agreements 
where representatives of workers and employers may be expected to monitor the performance of 
providers and protect the interests of pensioners. In a system of non-employer-based individual 
accounts, a central register of performance data and an effective supervision of providers are 
indispensable. 
 
6.4  Regulation of Broker Commissions 
 
The structure and level of commissions payable to brokers and agents also need to be closely 
monitored and to be subject to caps if they become too high and give rise to market distortions. 
In addition to being subject to an upper limit, such as the 2.5 percent cap introduced in Chile in 
2004, commissions could also be made payable over the whole duration of the annuity contract 
and not concentrated in the first few years. One way to achieve this is by prohibiting upfront fees 
on retiring workers and only allowing regular fees on monthly payments. In the US, broker 
commissions on sales of variable annuities exceed 5 percent and may even reach 8 percent of the 
premium. This probably explains the large volume of policy exchanges when the surrender 
charge period is concluded (see Annex C). 
 
6.5  Prevention of Deceptive Pricing Practices 
 
Another potential problem concerns the use of deceptive pricing practices. This is a more serious 
risk in the case of participating policies where the use of opaque smoothing mechanisms may 
conceal the true level of investment profitability. If providers are free to set initial payments on 
participating policies and apply entry (front-load) and exit fees, there will be a strong temptation 
to offer annuitants high initial payments in order to attract their business but declare low bonuses 
in subsequent years to compensate providers for the elevated initial payments. If switching is not 
allowed, annuitants will be captive in providers that may produce worse results over the long 
term. Of course, poor bonus performance will reduce the attractiveness of such providers to new 
retirees but retiring workers may still be tempted by the high initial payments.  
 
Lack of comprehensive information on long-term performance may inhibit effective scrutiny of 
different providers. Hefty exit fees may also discourage annuitants to switch to other providers 
when switching is allowed. Such practices are not uncommon in retail financial markets as was 
highlighted by the extensive use of very low teaser rates, high loan-to-value ratios, and 
prohibitively high prepayment fees in the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
 
A related issue in the marketing of VPAs concerns the potentially misleading use of bonus 
projections and illustrations. These are often used aggressively at the point of sale. Although 
providers are required to indicate that past performance does not guarantees future results, 
brokers and selling agents may resort to unreasonable illustrations of future investment 
performance and bonuses in the promotion of their products. 
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Creating a comprehensive central register on performance along the lines suggested above and 
compulsory use of standardized disclosure templates will contain the tendency to abuse 
illustrations of future performance and projected bonuses and will play a big part in containing 
deceptive practices. Regulating pricing policies and the setting of initial payments is another 
option that may be more relevant for countries with less developed insurance markets (see 
section 4 above). 
 
6.6  Prohibition of Perverse Marketing Practices 
 
When longevity risk is shared among annuitants, competition in the market for variable payout 
annuities may take a perverse form. In order to increase their market share and expand their 
business, annuity providers with a preponderance of low-risk clients may decide to offer 
attractive terms to new clients with higher-risk characteristics, effectively forcing low-risk 
annuitants, i.e., individuals with short life expectancy, to share the higher longevity risk of high-
risk annuitants and thus causing unfair transfers across different groups.  
 
Admittedly such marketing campaigns may not be easy to design and implement. But a more 
likely occurrence is a friendly or hostile merger of providers with different risk profiles. When 
marketing policies undergo drastic change, annuitants should be allowed to switch to another 
provider within a specified period of time and without incurring any exit fees.  
 
Such measures may not prove adequate if annuitants do not respond in a timely fashion to the 
period  of  no  exit  fees.  In  fact,  given  their  old  age  and  the  general  lack  of  consumer 
responsiveness to price signals in retail financial markets, it is unlikely that they will do so in 
sufficiently large numbers. A more drastic and  effective protection of the rights  of low-risk 
annuitants would need to be provided by regulators and supervisors.   
 
Providers of VPAs depend on their investment performance and their management of longevity 
risk to attract new business. It is important that marketing regulations deter providers and their 
brokers  from  emphasizing  recent  investment  returns  that  are  not  good  predictors  of  future 
performance,  but  rather  focus  on  factors  that  affect  long-term  performance,  such  as  the 
soundness  of their investment  policies, the level  of their operating costs and fees,  and their 
profit-sharing policies. 
7.  Market Structure, Prudential Regulation and Government Guarantees 
 
7.1  The Regulation of Market Structure 
 
A key policy question concerns the institutional organization of the market for annuity products. 
The choice is between decentralized competitive structures, which prevail in most OECD 
countries, and the creation of centralized agencies that are responsible for all or some of the 
services offered by annuity providers. A centralized agency for some segment of the market may, 
of course, operate alongside decentralized structures in other segments. 
 
Decentralized  competitive  market  structures  promote  greater  competition,  innovation  and 
efficiency.  A  major  advantage  is  the  ability  to  experiment  on  a  small  scale  as  individual 
institutions  introduce  new  products  or  practices  in  an  attempt  to  gain  competitive  edge.  In 30 
 
addition,  competition  among  innovating  providers  stimulates  the  search  for  improvisations. 
Innovation, experimentation and improvisation are more difficult, though not impossible, with 
centralized agencies. In fact, the record of innovation of centralized agencies in Denmark and 
Sweden has been remarkable.  
 
However, because of scale economies and high marketing costs, decentralized markets suffer 
from growing market consolidation, veering over time toward oligopolistic structures and the 
prevalence of a small number of providers. This tends to negate their innovation and efficiency 
advantages. The case for a decentralized competitive structure is significantly weakened if strict 
restrictions  apply  to  the  offer  of  annuity  products  and  their  pricing.  It  is  also  weakened  if 
providers  use  common  life  tables,  in  which  case  competition  is  effectively  limited  to  asset 
management  and  marketing  campaigns.  Thus,  countries  that  adopt  decentralized  competitive 
structures  need  to  monitor  closely  the  behavior  and  performance  of  providers  of  retirement 
products  to  ensure  that  profit  margins  are  reasonable  and  the  benefits  of  competition  and 
innovation are not eroded by increasingly oligopolistic and wasteful practices. 
 
Centralized provision enjoys a number of potential advantages. It allows for a larger base of risk 
pooling, especially if annuitization is compulsory, benefits from scale economies and avoids the 
heavy marketing costs that are incurred by decentralized providers. On the other hand, its main 
disadvantages  are  the  potentially  weaker  incentives  for  product  innovation  and  operational 
efficiency  that  may  result  from  compulsory  participation  and  monopoly  power.  With  public 
ownership and/or extensive public regulation, there is also a high risk of extraneous interference 
in annuity pricing and asset management. Such interference may well result in transferring the 
investment and longevity risks back to the state.  
 
Centralized provision is quite common in annuity markets. The zero and first public pillars, 
where they exist, rely on centralized provision through a single public agency. As they almost 
always involve the offer of compulsory inflation-indexed lifetime annuities, their products play a 
central part in the annuity markets of most countries. However, some countries, and especially 
Denmark and Sweden, have gone one step further and have created centralized public agencies 
for the offer of supplementary lifetime annuities. These operate alongside private providers that 
offer industry or employer schemes covered by collective labor agreements as well as personal 
pension plans.  
 
The centralized agencies of Denmark and Sweden operate with a very high level of efficiency 
and have exhibited an impressive record of innovation. The Danish ATP operates a compulsory 
pension scheme with centralized asset management and offers variable „guarantee and bonus‟ 
annuities. Despite its public status, it has often taken the lead in promoting product innovation 
and adopting sophisticated asset management (Vittas 2008). The Swedish PPM is responsible for 
the maintenance of accounts and the payment of benefits as well as for handling the longevity 
risk of life annuities. For traditional „guarantee and bonus‟ annuities it also retains responsibility 
for centralized  asset management  and  appoints  internal  and external  asset  managers  for this 
purpose. But in the case of „unit-linked‟ annuities, asset management is decentralized. 
 
The Danish and Swedish experiences show that, despite their weaker incentives, public entities 
can take the lead in promoting product innovation or adopting innovative investment strategies. 
The Danish ATP has been a leader in the pricing of life annuities and the use of long-term 31 
 
interest  rate  swaps  and  other  asset  management  techniques.  In  Sweden  the  combination  of 
centralized  administration  with  decentralized  asset  management  has  been  a  public  sector 
innovation,  which  has  been  copied  by  the  private  sector  (Palmer  2008).  But  public  sector 
institutions in most low and middle-income countries tend to suffer from operating inefficiency 
and a poor record of innovation. The key requirement is to adopt robust governance safeguards 
with high levels of transparency and public accountability.  
 
The regulation of marketing and pricing policies is in general much simpler in a centralized 
market  structure.  There  is  no  need  for  elaborate  controls  on  marketing  campaigns  and  the 
creation of electronic quotation systems. Pricing policies need to reflect all relevant variables to 
ensure long-run sustainability and avoid unintended inter- and intra-generational transfers, but 
there is no concern about price dispersion and exposure to deceptive policies and heightened 
bankruptcy risk. The marketing of variable annuities is not faced with the perverse incentives 
that afflict decentralized markets. 
 
The centralized institution needs  to  respond  to enquiries from  retiring  workers by providing 
appropriate quotations taking into account the age cohort of applicants and their product choice. 
To be able to do this effectively, it needs to construct life tables by product and cohort and also 
apply the appropriate yield curves to calculate the initial annuity payments by type of product. 
 
The main challenge for the centralized provider is the creation of a sophisticated delivery system 
where trained professionals have access to detailed data and are able to respond in a prompt and 
efficient manner to enquiries from retiring workers. To ensure a high quality of service, this 
component of the centralized structure may be outsourced through competitive bidding to a small 
number of private operators, subject to clearly defined standards of accuracy and speed.  Another 
main challenge ensuring transparency, top notch governance and independence to prevent such a 
system being subject to political interference in its operations and its financial soundness. 
 
In the case of „guarantee and bonus‟ variable annuities, the centralized institution needs to set out 
clearly the calculation of initial payments, the offer of guaranteed benefits, and the determination 
of annual bonuses. It also needs to clarify its policies on the reversibility of annual bonuses. 
Using conservative assumptions with regard to the technical rate of interest and life tables will 
result in low initial payments that may give rise to significant transfers from older to younger 
cohorts. All these policy variables and objectives need to be clearly spelled out in a transparent 
and effective way. 
 
In  the  case  of  unit-linked  annuities  with  decentralized  asset  management,  the  three  main 
concerns, in addition to setting the AIR and appropriate mortality tables, are the selection of 
authorized asset managers, the organization of periodic switching among asset managers, and the 
handling of minimum guarantees, if any are offered. The management of longevity risk needs to 
be clarified in both types of variable annuities, including the treatment of retiring workers with 
impaired health. 
 
The treatment of impaired lives poses a difficult managerial and regulatory challenge linked to 
the political difficulties of defining the admissible level of health impairment and the required 
documentation  for  establishing  the  health  status  of  individual  annuitants.  In  decentralized 
markets, there is greater room for experimentation as is shown by recent developments in the 32 
 
UK.  The  centralized  providers  in  Denmark  and  Sweden  have  not  so  far  created  separate 
longevity pools based on health status.
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Countries that adopt a centralized structure for second pillar pensions could follow the Swedish 
example and use a public entity for the maintenance of accounts and the payment of benefits as 
well as for handling the longevity risk of life annuities, but organize asset management on a 
decentralized basis. This would be attractive in the case of unit-linked variable payout annuities, 
allowing participants to select investment  funds from an approved list  of asset managers. A 
competitive bidding process could be undertaken at specified time intervals to ensure that the 
most efficient  asset managers with the lowest  operating fees  are allowed to participate. The 
centralized  institution  would  collect  all  individual  asset  mandates  and  transfer  funds  to  the 
selected asset managers without revealing the names of their clients.  
 
Taking  into  account  the  competitive  inefficiencies  of  decentralized  markets,  especially  in 
supplying  variable  payout  annuities,  and  the  advantages  of  allowing  constrained  choice  to 
retiring  workers  from  a  broader  menu  of  retirement  products,  an  attractive  approach  to  the 
organization of market structure may well be to combine centralized and decentralized provision. 
A  centralized  provider,  focusing  on  account  administration  and  longevity  insurance,  in 
conjunction with decentralized asset management, could be used for unit-linked variable payout 
annuities,  while  fixed  real  and  nominal  annuities  could  be  offered  through  a  decentralized 
competitive market. 
 
7.2  Prudential Regulation 
 
The main objective of prudential regulation is to strengthen the solvency of annuity providers. 
The maintenance of technical reserves is the first step in this process. Solvency strengthening 
also involves the maintenance of an adequate level of capital. Historically, capital requirements 
for life insurance companies have been related to the level of technical reserves and have not 
been risk-based. In most cases, the required capital equals 4 percent of technical provisions plus 
0.3 percent of sums assured. This is reduced to 1 percent when the providers do not assume the 
investment risk. A similar approach is followed for annuities, except that in their context, the 
relevant risk exposure is respectively the technical provisions and the amount of annual 
payments.  
 
Increasingly, however, the riskiness of both assets and liabilities is taken into account in setting 
capital levels. Several countries, including Canada and the United States, have long applied risk-
based capital requirements and this approach is now spreading to other countries around the 
world.  
 
In the European Union, the introduction of the so-called Solvency II regime has been under 
intensive discussion for a number of years. This will replace the solvency I regime that has been 
applied since the mid-1970s. The new solvency system will also define the types of capital as 
well as the types of assets that are admissible for prudential purposes. 
 
The role of hedging facilities in alleviating reserve and capital requirements is also actively 
debated in a similar fashion to the use of reinsurance facilities. Considerable emphasis is 
                                                             
29 See Sigma (2008) and Rocha and Vittas (2010) for a brief discussion of these issues. 33 
 
increasingly placed on solvency testing whereby annuity providers are required to conduct stress 
tests on a regular basis to assess the impact on solvency of prescribed shocks in financial 
markets. The nature and structure of stress tests is still evolving. 
 
The various stress tests that have been applied in different countries are still at an early stage of 
development.  In  general,  they  have  been  specified  in  static  terms,  have  not  reflected  past 
experience, and have been invariant to the state of financial markets. Ideally, the stress tests 
should take into account the historical variance and covariance of asset returns over a sufficiently 
long period of time and should allow for the state of financial markets.  
 
A difficult policy dilemma faced by the stress tests, and risk-based supervision in general, is that 
they require annuity providers to assess their resilience to declining market values without 
making any allowance for the long-term nature of their liabilities. Even at times when market 
values are at historically low levels, annuity providers may be required to test their capital base 
against further substantial declines in market values. While there is no easy answer to this 
dilemma, excessive reliance on such stress tests runs the risk of forcing institutions to adopt 
overly conservative investment policies to the detriment of investment returns.
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The required solvency margin could be related to the size of the deviation of current prices from 
long-term trends. If individual institutions maintain reasonably matched and/or hedged positions 
between their assets and liabilities, the stress tests would have little impact on their eq uity 
positions or buffer funds. However, if they exhibit considerable deviation from full matching, the 
stress tests would indicate the size of the buffer fund that would be required to ensure solvency.  
 
Solvency requirements and dynamic solvency testing  should, in principle, be the same for both 
fixed and variable payout annuities. Guaranteed benefits of VPAs should be treated like fixed 
liabilities. An important complication may arise from the potentially greater use of hedging 
facilities in the case of  guaranteed options given to holders of variable annuities. Counterparty 
risk would then need to be closely monitored, especially if customized, non -exchange-traded 
products are utilized. In addition, the likely behavior of annuitants in exercising the opti ons 
offered to them would present a difficult managerial  and regulatory  challenge because past 
experience has shown that this is very hard to model and predict with a satisfactory degree of 
accuracy. 
 
7.3  Government Guarantees 
 
Government guarantees merit serious consideration in any pension system. Bankruptcy risk is 
present in all types of financial products, but is particularly important in the case of life annuities. 
In recent years, it has become increasingly possible for life annuities to be transferred among 
providers, magnifying the risk exposure of annuitants, who have no control over the transfer 
process. This places a clear responsibility on the regulatory authorities to adopt a robust and 
effective system of prudential regulation and supervision and to protect annuitants in cases of 
provider failure. 
                                                             
30 In Denmark the regulators allowed the use of a more lenient yield curve between October 2008 and October 2010 
rather than causing institutions to engage in forced sales in a declining market. Similar forbearance during the extreme 
circumstances of the 2008 global financial crisis has been exhibited by bank and insurance regulators in most other 
advanced countries.    34 
 
 
The government guarantees could emulate the practice evolving in deposit insurance schemes, 
including upper limits on the amounts insured and application of risk-based premiums on annuity 
providers. A reasonable amount of coinsurance by pensioners should also be included in order to 
minimize the possible loss of market discipline at the point of purchase.
31 The guarantees could 
cover 100 percent of benefits up to a specified basic threshold  and then a very high percentage, 
perhaps 75 or even 90 percent, of amounts above the threshold up to a reasonable upper limit. In 
the case of variable  payout annuities, the guarantees should cover the guaranteed benefits and 
losses arising from insolvency  resulting from fraud and gross negligence but they should not 
cover investment losses that arise in the normal course of business  from fluctuations in asset 
prices. 
 
The expected fiscal cost of government guarantees should be subject to detailed estimation and 
their financing should be carefully considered. Government guarantees may be financed by ex 
ante or ex post assessments on all providers or from budgetary resources. Risk-based premiums 
may be applied, although these are often difficult to design. As in the case of deposit insurance, 
adopting a speedy resolution mechanism that provides for early interventions in companies 
facing financial difficulties and nearing insolvency is essential for containing the costs of the 
guarantees and minimizing distortions in incentives. 
   
                                                             
31 In bank deposits, the use of co- insurance has been declining in recent years, because of the realization that bank runs 
were more likely to happen when depositors were exposed to significant losses. However, in life insurance and annuity 
business, runs on providers are less likely to occur and, if they happen, they do not have the same adverse impact as bank 




The Payment Formula of the Standard Unit-Linked Variable Payout Annuity
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The initial benefit payment is calculated in a similar fashion to a fixed annuity and is based on an 
assumed investment rate of return (AIR). If the benefit is paid at the beginning of the year, the 
net capital premium, K, is equal to the present value of the following series of payments over the 
life of the annuitant: 
 




  K = B + B*P1*v + B*P2*v
2 + B*P3*v
3 + B*P4*v
4 + . . . + B*P(n-1)*v
(n-1)     
 
K is the sum of the present values of all benefit payments; 
At is the present value of benefit payment in year t and is also the reserve set aside for making 
this payment;  
B is the benefit payment; 
Pt is the probability of survival at the end of the t year or the beginning of the (t+1) year; 
v is the discount factor, which is equal to 1/(1+AIR); 
AIR is the assumed investment rate of return; and 
RIRt is the realized investment rate of return in year t. 
 
At the beginning of the second year the reserve for the second benefit payment to all surviving 
annuitants in the standard unit-linked VPA is: 
 
  A2 = B*P1*(1+RIR1)/(1+AIR) 
 
Dividing by P1 gives the benefit per surviving annuitant: 
 
  B2 = B*(1+RIR1)/(1+AIR) 
 
The reserve for the third benefit payment to all surviving annuitants is: 
 
  A3 = B*P2*(1+RIR1)(1+RIR2)/(1+AIR)(1+AIR) 
 
Dividing by P2 gives the benefit per surviving annuitant at the beginning of the third year: 
 
  B3 = B*(1+RIR1)(1+RIR2)/(1+AIR)(1+AIR) = B2*(1+RIR2)/(1+AIR) 
 
The reserve for the fourth benefit payment to all surviving annuitants is: 
 
  A4 = B*P3*(1+RIR1)(1+RIR2)(1+RIR3)/(1+AIR)(1+AIR)(1+AIR) 
 
Dividing by P3 gives the benefit per surviving annuitant at the beginning of the fourth year: 
 
                                                             
32 This annex draws on Macarchuk (1969), Feuer(1969) and Fowler (2010). 36 
 
  B4 = B*(1+RIR1)(1+RIR2)(1+RIR3)/(1+AIR)(1+AIR)(1+AIR) = B3*(1+RIR3)/(1+AIR) 
 
Continuing with subsequent payments yields the formula: 
 
  Bt = B(t-1)*(1+RIR(t-1))/(1+AIR) 
 
The rationale behind this formula is that the realized investment rate of return (RIR) must be 
equal to the AIR for the benefit to remain constant. If the RIR is higher, the benefit increases; if it 
is lower, the benefit decreases. However, if the RIR is higher for a number of years, a big fall 
below the AIR is needed for the benefit to decrease below its initial level. Nevertheless, 
investment returns on equity markets and other real assets are prone to very large fluctuations 
that may indeed cause later benefits to fall below the initial level. This is clearly more likely to 
happen when using a high AIR and this is the reason why regulators in most jurisdictions impose 
an upper limit on the level of the AIR. 
 
      







This Annex reviews the main features of the two types of PPM annuities offered by the Swedish 
Pensions Agency (SPA). To set these products in context, this is preceded by a brief exposition of the 
role of the PPM/SPA in the Swedish pension system. 
 
B.1  The Basic Set Up 
 
The PPM (Premiepensionsmyndigheten – or Premium Pension Authority) was created in 1994 as a 
separate government agency to manage the funded component of the new Swedish public pension 
system. In 2010, it was merged into the Swedish Pensions Agency (SPA), a new entity that was 
established to administer all public pensions. It now operates as a department of the SPA. 
 
The SPA maintains the individual premium pension accounts of the new public component, collects 
and credits contributions to individual accounts from the Swedish tax office, transfers funds across 
different asset managers, collects and makes available (daily) information on participating mutual 
funds, offers a wide range of information services to participants, and is the monopoly provider of 
the PPM annuities.  
 
The new financial defined contribution (FDC) scheme is a compulsory plan that is funded with a 
contribution of 2.5 percent of covered earnings. The contribution to the nonfinancial or notional 
defined contribution (NDC) scheme, which replaced the old defined benefit scheme but continues to 
be  operated  as  an  unfunded  pay-as-you-go  scheme,  was  set  at  16  percent.  These  mandatory 




Workers born before 1938 are entirely  covered by the old scheme, while those born after 1953 are 
covered by the new scheme. For the transition generation,  earnings of persons born  in 1938 are 
covered 16/20 by the old scheme and 4/20 by the new; the respective fractions change by 1/20th each 
year so that people born in 1953 are covered 1/20 by the old scheme and 19/20 by the new. It follows 
that people born in 1938 were required to make a contribution of just 0.5 percent of earnings  to the 
FDC, while those born in 1944 were still contributing only 1.25 percent. It was people who were less 
than 40 at the time the new system became active that were required to make contributions at the full 
rate of 2.5 percent.  However, even the full rate is  a small contribution rate and underscores the 
supplementary nature of the FDC. 
 
Contributions  to the FDC  are collected together with all other social insurance contributions, 
including  NDC  contributions  -  and  taxes  in  general  -  by  the  National Tax  Authority.  These 
contributions are initially placed in a global account with the National Debt Office earning interest at 
                                                             
33 This Annex draws extensively on Palmer (2008) and the updated summary of that paper that is included in Rocha et al 
(2011). The discussion of the Payout Stage is based on detailed data and information kindly provided by Lars Billberg, 
Chief Actuary of the SPA. The review is based on data provided in the spring and summer of 2010. 
34 Nearly all Swedish workers also participate in occupational pension plans that are governed by collective labor 
agreements. For the majority of workers the contribution rate to these plans amounts to 4.5 percent, for a total 
mandatory pension saving of 23 percent of earnings. However, high-income workers make contributions to occupational 
plans at much higher rates, that may reach up to 18 percent, to compensate for the low overall ceiling of the public 
pillars. The main occupational plans are now organized in the same way as the PPM pillar (Palmer 2008).   38 
 
the  average  yield  of  Swedish  government  bonds.  Allowing  for  the  process  of  income-tax 
reconciliation, new contributions are credited to individual accounts annually, on average about 18 
months after they have been withheld. 
 
B.2  The Accumulation Stage 
 
During the accumulation stage, the FDC scheme is based on centralized administration, avoiding 
excessive marketing costs and benefiting from scale economies, but combined with decentralized 
asset management. When contributions are credited to individual accounts, participants have the right 
to  select  their  asset  managers  and  investment  funds.  The  SPA  acts  as  a  clearinghouse  between 
workers and the participating private funds. Allocations of new contributions and requests for fund 
switches are all grouped together and executed jointly on each transaction day by the staff of the 
SPA. The transactions are registered on individual accounts kept by the  SPA. A fund manager‟s 
client is the SPA, not the individual participant.   
 
All fund managers, licensed to operate in Sweden, are allowed to participate in the PPM system. 
Fund managers are required to follow the rules and regulations set out by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Agency (SFSA), which supervises the funds. Fund providers must sign an agreement 
with  the  SPA,  which  includes  agreeing  to  provide  information  upon  request,  not  to  charge 
withdrawal fees, to compute and report electronically and on a daily basis fund share values to the 
SPA, and to provide a periodic report of administration charges.  
 
A company registered to do business in the PPM system can offer one or more funds. In December 
2009, 88 domestic and foreign companies offered 777 funds in the PPM system. There is a publicly 
managed default fund for non-choosers, known as the AP7 fund, which throughout the short life of 
the system has held the assets of around a third of the system‟s participants, but a smaller percentage 
of total assets because workers who make an active choice have on average higher account balances. 
 
In 2007, workers were allowed to switch back into a premium choice fund operated by the AP7 fund 
after having made an active choice for another fund. In 2010, the default fund was redesigned as a 
leveraged lifecycle fund,
35 while the AP7 premium choice fund was closed down and was replaced 
by two new funds, one invested in equities and the other in fixed income securities.  Reflecting 
economies of scale, these funds will charge management fees of 15 and 9 basis points respectively, 
the lowest in the PPM system. 
 
Fund switching is allowed on a daily basis, although switching transactions take around three 
business days. In 2009 about 15 percent of participants performed one or more switches, with an 
average of five switches per year per switching person. The number of sw itches has risen steadily 
from 1.2 million in 2005 to 2.6 million in 2007 and 4.5 million in 2009 . Nearly all switches (99.8 
percent) were performed in 2009 using the  SPA‟s website. Advisory services have been developed, 
offering tools for account follow-up and for fund switching. One such application is available free of 
charge on the system's website but other advisory services are offered by external parties for a fee. 
 
The agreement that fund managers conclude with the SPA also involves accepting a system of 
maximum fee charges. A fund can levy its normal administrative fee minus a discount that depends 
                                                             
35 Individual accounts in the default fund will be invested 150 percent in equities through the use of derivatives until their 
owners reach 55 and will then be gradually switched into fixed income investments. These changes reflect the continuous 
modifications of the new system as its managers seek to adopt the most appealing solutions. This pattern is also reflected 
in the products for the payout stage.   39 
 
on the balance of PPM assets held. Since there are economies of scale in large holdings of PPM 
assets, the size of the allowable administration fee decreases with the scale of PPM assets managed 
by all funds in a registered company. Prior to April 2007, the allowable fees were based on individual 
funds‟ holdings of PPM balances. In 2009, total costs for the scheme amounted to 26 basis points, 
according to the PPM annual report.  
 
Participants in the PPM-administered FDC scheme increased from 4.4 million in 2000, the first year 
of operation, to 6.2 million in 2009. In 2009, there were 664,000 pensioners in the PPM pillar, about 
a quarter of all pensioners. The annual flow of new funds into the system has been just about one 
percent of GDP. At year‟s end 2009, total assets posted on individual accounts equaled 340 billion 
SEK – equivalent to about 11 percent of GDP. The average nominal rate of return from 1995 through 
2009 was 3.2 percent (with an average rate of inflation of around 2 percent). In 2009, in addition to 
the funds that were posted on individual accounts, the SPA/PPM also held 27.6 billion SEK that 
represented the contributions made during 2009 and invested with the National Debt Office.  
 
Despite the very large number of participating funds, it is a characteristic of the PPM system that 
fund choices are highly concentrated. In 2009, the ten largest funds, including the default fund, 
accounted for 44 percent of total PPM assets, while the share of the top twenty funds equaled 54 
percent of total assets. The Premium Savings Fund, which was the default fund managed by the 
Seventh AP fund, accounted for 26 percent of total assets. 
 
Another characteristic has been the strong preference of participants for equity investments. At the 
end of 2009, almost 90 percent of PPM assets were invested in equities, an asset allocation pattern 
that  has  been  prevalent  since  the  creation  of  the  PPM  pillar.  This  may  at  first  glance  appear 
excessive. However, as noted by Palmer (2008), it can be explained by two factors. First, for younger 
cohorts, i.e. those born after 1954, a high proportion of equity investments is generally considered 
appropriate. Second, for older cohorts, the accumulated account balances in the new system have 
been very small, both because the contribution rate has been very low and because the period of 
contribution has been short. Thus, the relevance of the PPM system for the overall pensions of older 
participants has been minimal. Hence, it is not surprising that older cohorts have tended to “take a 
gamble” by investing heavily in equities. 
 
B.3  The Payout Stage 
 
The  SPA  is  the  sole  provider  of  PPM  annuity  products  for  the  public  FDC  scheme.  These  are 
specified in law. Participants can choose between single and joint life annuities, which can take the 
form  of  variable  annuities,  either  traditional  participating  (with-profits)  annuities  or  unit-linked 
annuities. Lump-sum payments or withdrawals over shorter periods than a life are not permitted. To 
date, around 90 percent of PPM pensioners have chosen an individual and about 10 percent a joint-
life annuity. Most pensioners (85 percent) have selected unit-linked annuities. 
 
If they choose a traditional variable annuity, participants turn over their fund balances at retirement 
to the SPA/PPM, which currently enlists the investment services of a publicly managed fund for its 
bond portfolio and, beginning in 2007, four private funds for managing its equity portfolio. A unit-
linked annuity leaves the account balance in the individual‟s chosen private funds. In both cases, 
annuity payments are recalculated at the beginning of each calendar year by taking into account the 
investment performance and longevity experience of annuitants. Unisex mortality tables are used. 
Participants  are  allowed  to  transfer  their  pension  rights  to  spouses  but  this  applies  only  to 
contributions made and investment income earned after the right to transfer has been exercised. To 40 
 
date only a few thousand participants have taken advantage of this option. Annual pension amounts 
are still very small, due to the very short coverage time and the gradual transition rules. 
 
The PPM pillar offers two types of annuities: unit-linked and participating annuities. It operates with 
very low operating fees that amounted to 24 basis points in 2009. It also has a policy of distributing 
100 percent of profits in both types of annuities. It does not utilize a smoothing mechanism and is 
thus highly transparent. Considerable effort is spent in communicating the mechanics and results of 
the system to members through the annual publication of the Orange Report that covers the whole of 
the public pension system and through so-called individualized Orange Letters that are mailed to 
both active workers and retirees with annual details on the performance of their account and their 
prospective  (or  actual)  benefits.  The  SPA/PPM  also  maintains  an  efficient  website  with  a  large 
quantity of data on various aspects of the PPM system.  
 
B.4  The PPM Unit-Linked Annuities 
 
The mechanics of the PPM unit-linked annuities involve the calculation of initial payments and then 
annual adjustments in light of investment performance and longevity experience. The initial 
payments are calculated at retirement by taking into account the accumulated capital during the 
active life of the retiring worker, an assumed investment rate of return (AIR) and the projected unisex 
mortality table corresponding to the age of the retiring worker. The SPA uses the mortality tables 
prepared by Statistics Sweden, although it is responsible for selecting between alternative projection 
scenarios and for making adjustments to the mortality assumptions in particular cases. 
 
Table B.1 shows the initial calculation and subsequent changes for a worker who retired at 65 in 
2002.
36 This worker had accumulated a sum of 5,000 Swedish crowns, which was less than 1,000 US 
dollars, a reflection of the fact that he or she contributed for a short period of time and at a very low 
rate. The account balance was divided by the annuity factor of 13.87, which was calculated using the 
actual age of the retiree, an AIR of 4 percent, a projected expense rate of 0.30 percent, and expected 
mortality. 
 
The annuity income during 2002 amounted to 360 SEK, which corresponded to 30 SEK per month or 
about 6 US dollars! This was clearly a paltry amount for any country, let alone Sweden. Its 
calculation and payment was the result of the decision not to allow any lump sums, even if 
accumulated balances were puny. However, one benefit of having to calculate and pay annuity 
benefits during the early years of the new system is the experience that has been gained on how best 
to organize the offer of annuity products. 
 
During 2002, the account suffered an investment loss of 31.3 percent, reflecting the investment 
choices made by the account holder. This resulted in a loss of 1,509 SEK, which was obtained by 
calculating the negative rate of return with the amount given by the original balance less half the 
yearly annuity income. The latter was in most cases paid at the beginning of each month. The 
account balance was then debited with the operating fees and credited with the survival credits 
(inheritance gains in Swedish terminology), computed in the same way as the investment income. 
                                                             
36 This is a hypothetical illustration that is intended to utilize all investment performance and operating cost data since 
PPM annuities started to be offered in 2002. In fact, a 65-year old worker retiring on the first day of 2002 would have 
been born on the last day of 1936 and would not therefore have been covered by the PPM pillar. However, a co-insured 
spouse could have been covered. Alternatively, a person born on the first day of 1938 could have started receiving a 
PPM pension on the second day of 2002 at age 64. 41 
 
The operating fee amounted to 0.30 percent, while the mortality rate was equal to 1.18 percent. The 
account balance amounted at the end of the year to 3,173 SEK. 
 
Table B.2 shows the AIR, the assumed cost rate, the realized rate of investment return, the annual 
operating fee and the mortality rate that were used in subsequent years for the calculation of benefit 
payments. It can be seen that the AIR was lowered to 3 percent between 2003 and 2006 (effective 
rate 2.7 percent) and was then raised back to 4 percent (effective rate 3.9 percent). The assumed 
expense rate was lowered to 0.10 percent in 2007. The charged operating fee fell to 0.16 percent in 
2006 but then rose again and reached 0.24 percent in 2010. The mortality rate experienced a steady 
increase and reached 1.94 percent in 2009 but then fell back to 1.63 percent in 2010.  
 
Table B.1: Evolution of Annuity Income in the PPM Unit-Linked Annuities 
Year  Age  Balance  Annuity  Annuity  Investment  Operating  Survival 
      Factor  Income  Income  Fees  Credits 
               
2002  65  5,000  13.87  360  -1,509  14  57 
2003  66  3,173  14.83  214  534  9  37 
2004  67  3,521  14.35  245  292  9  53 
2005  68  3,611  14.57  248  1,057  8  52 
2006  69  4,465  14.13  316  517  7  71 
2007  70  4,730  11.65  406  253  7  74 
2008  71  4,644  11.25  413  -1,531  9  75 
2009  72  2,767  10.85  255  918  7  51 
2010  73  3,475  10.76  323    8  54 
Source: SPA 
 
Tables B.1and B.2 show a very large fluctuation in investment income. This is a result of the very 
high concentration in equity investments and reflects the unusually turbulent performance of equity 
markets over the past decade. It should be noted that the unit-linked annuities are offered without any 
guarantees. Pensioners are exposed to very high investment risk but the sums involved are so small 
that very little can be inferred about the welfare implications of this product. Of course, active 
workers have also experienced similar wild fluctuations. Seeking more stable asset allocations could 
well be more meaningful for workers in their fifties who are approaching retirement and may have 
more substantial sums of money at risk.    
 
Table B.2: Determinants of the PPM Unit-Linked Annuities 
Year  Age  AIR  Assumed  Investment  Annual  Mortality  Implied 
      Cost  Return  Fee  Rate  Period 
               
2002  65  4%  0.30%  -31.3%  0.30%  1.18%  19.82 
2003  66  3%  0.30%  17.4%  0.30%  1.22%  19.20 
2004  67  3%  0.30%  8.6%  0.27%  1.55%  18.38 
2005  68  3%  0.30%  30.3%  0.22%  1.50%  18.75 
2006  69  3%  0.30%  12.0%  0.16%  1.64%  18.01 
2007  70  4%  0.10%  5.6%  0.16%  1.64%  15.17 
2008  71  4%  0.10%  -34.5%  0.20%  1.69%  14.47 
2009  72  4%  0.10%  34.8%  0.25%  1.94%  13.79 
2010  73  4%  0.10%    0.24%  1.63%  13.64 
Source: SPA 
 
The last column of Table B.2 shows what is described as the implied (fixed) period. This is the 
period for which the annuity would have been paid if it had been arranged for a fixed period, given 42 
 
the AIR and annuity factor used. This is not the same as life expectancy but provides an approximate 
estimate of the latter. The sudden fall in the implied period in 2007 was caused by the adoption by 
the SPA of the medium mortality scenario of Statistics Sweden (until then the low mortality scenario 
had been used). This shows the willingness of policymakers to use a less conservative mortality 
table. Such an approach is amply justified by the fact that the longevity risk is assumed by the 
retirees. 
 
Table B.3: Projected and Observed Makeham Parameters 
Year  Age  Projected  Observed 
    A  b  C  A  B  C 
               
2002  65  0.00050  0.00000355  0.1170  0.00020  0.00000744  0.1122 
2003  66  0.00050  0.00000355  0.1170  0.00020  0.00001294  0.1027 
2004  67  0.00050  0.00000355  0.1170  0.00020  0.00001060  0.1078 
2005  68  0.00250  0.00000750  0.1050  0.00009  0.00001180  0.1043 
2006  69  0.00250  0.00000750  0.1050  0.00009  0.00001750  0.0984 
2007  70  0.00820  0.00000010  0.1576  0.00010  0.00001390  0.1002 
2008  71  0.00820  0.00000010  0.1576  0.00030  0.00000450  0.1149 
2009  72  0.00820  0.00000010  0.1576  0.00030  0.00001020  0.1039 
2010  73  0.00640  0.00000018  0.1498  0.00030  0.00001280  0.0970 
Source: SPA 
 
The expected mortality that is reflected in the annuity factor is based on the Makeham parameters 
used by Statistics Sweden for its population projections. These are shown in Table B.3 together with 
the parameters that are used for calculating observed mortality, which is in turn used for computing 
the annual survival credits.
37  
 
B.5  The PPM Participating (With-Profits) Annuities 
 
Tables B.4 and B.5 show the same calculations for the participating annuities. The benefit of using a 
more stable asset allocation is clearly shown in the investment results and the greater stability of 
annual benefits.  
 
The tables show that between 2002 and 2006, the same AIR was used for both types of annuities, but 
since 2007 while the AIR for the unit-linked annuity was raised back to 4 percent, that for the 
participating annuity was lowered further to 2.3 percent. The calculation of expected mortality and 
the derivation of observed mortality, which is used for calculating the annual survival credits, have 
been based on the same Makeham parameters for the two annuities (Table B.3). 
 
Participating annuities are offered with a minimum guaranteed benefit. For workers who retired in 
2002, this was calculated with a 3 percent rate of interest (2.7 percent effective) but a lower expected 
mortality. The SPA/PPM assumed a further 10 percent improvement in mortality over and above the 
low mortality scenario used by Statistics Sweden. In 2002, the guaranteed benefit amounted to 317 
SEK per year, which equaled 88 percent of the initial benefit.  
 
                                                             
37 The Makeham parameters for projected mortality were based: in 2002, on the low mortality scenario (LMS) for an 
individual born in 1941 from the 1999 population projections of Statistics Sweden; in 2005, on the LMS for an individual 
born in 1940 from the 2003 projections; in 2007, on the medium mortality scenario (MMS) for an individual born in 1943 
from the 2006 projections; and in 2010, on the MMS for an individual born in 1946 from the 2009 population projections. 
These are the closest age-cohorts used by Statistics Sweden. 43 
 
The rate of interest for the guarantee benefit was lowered in 2005 to 2.75 percent (2.45 percent 
effective) and was further lowered to zero percent (minus 0.1 percent effective) in 2007,while the 
more conservative mortality table continued to be used. For a person aged 65 and retiring in 2009 
with the same account balance of 5,000 SEK, the guaranteed benefit would amount to only 210 SEK. 
The initial benefit would be equal to 305 SEK, based on an annuity factor of 16.38 (Swedish 
Pensions Agency 2010). Thus, the guaranteed benefit would equal 69 percent of the initial benefit. 
 
Table B.4: Evolution of Annuity Income in the PPM Participating Annuity 
Year  Age  Balance  Annuity  Annuity  Investment  Operating  Survival 
      Factor  Income  Income  Fees  Credits 
               
2002  65  5,000  13.87  360  187  14  57 
2003  66  4,869  14.83  328  157  14  57 
2004  67  4,740  14.35  330  221  12  71 
2005  68  4,690  14.57  322  234  10  68 
2006  69  4,660  14.13  330  270  7  74 
2007  70  4,667  13.41  348  255  7  73 
2008  71  4,640  12.90  360  97  9  76 
2009  72  4,443  12.37  359  46  11  83 
2010  73  4,202  12.26  343    10  66 
Source: SPA 
 
So far the guarantees have not been activated for this cohort of retirees, although they came close to 
activation in 2005. When the guarantees are activated, the minimum benefits will be deducted from 
the accounts of the annuitants. This implies that annuitants will pay for the guarantees with their own 
funds but when the balances are exhausted, the SPA will pay for the guaranteed benefits from its own 
reserves for the remainder of their lives. One weakness of this annuity is that the guaranteed benefits 
are not indexed to inflation. Even a modest rate of inflation of 3 percent per year will cause a 
significant erosion of their real value.   
 
Table B.5: Determinants of the PPM Participating Annuity 
Year  Age  AIR  Assumed  Investment  Annual  Mortality  Implied 
      Cost  Return  Fee  Rate  Period 
               
2002  65  4.0%  0.30%  3.9%  0.30%  1.18%  18.80 
2003  66  3.0%  0.30%  3.3%  0.30%  1.22%  19.20 
2004  67  3.0%  0.30%  4.8%  0.27%  1.55%  18.38 
2005  68  3.0%  0.30%  5.2%  0.22%  1.50%  18.75 
2006  69  3.0%  0.30%  6.0%  0.16%  1.64%  18.01 
2007  70  2.3%  0.10%  5.7%  0.16%  1.64%  15.80 
2008  71  2.3%  0.10%  2.2%  0.20%  1.69%  15.08 
2009  72  2.3%  0.10%  1.1%  0.25%  1.94%  14.35 
2010  73  2.3%  0.10%    0.24%  1.63%  14.20 
Source: SPA 
 
B.6  Concluding Remarks 
 
This Annex provides a brief explanation of the mechanics of the two types of PPM annuities. The 
novel feature of these annuities is the treatment of longevity risk, which is shared among annuitants 
on an age cohort basis. The managers of the PPM pillar have considerable discretion in changing the 
basic determinants of benefit payments. These have been regularly modified as experience has been 
gained. There are clearly large economies of scale and significant benefits from being able to use a 44 
 
large pool of annuitants as well as from avoiding wasteful marketing costs. The public status of the 
SPA inspires greater confidence in the integrity of both its objectives and its implementation policies. 
 
But there are also some disadvantages. Other than the option of using joint life annuities, annuitants 
do not have the option of leaving bequests to their children or grandchildren or other beneficiaries. 
They also do not have the option of using lump sums, term annuities or phased withdrawals. The 
SPA has not so far experimented with creating special risk pools for annuitants with impaired health. 
 
The high exposure to equities and the concomitant wide fluctuation of investment returns of the unit-
linked annuity is not necessarily a disadvantage. It reflects the choices of individual participants and 
the small supplementary nature of the scheme. If the scheme was significantly larger, such high 
exposure would have been deemed excessive and perhaps a major disadvantage. But if the scheme 
was much larger, annuitants would most probably have selected funds with more stable net asset 
values. 
 
Two main points may be relevant for other countries that consider the use of participating or unit-
linked variable payout annuities for their mandatory pension pillars. First, the AIR used to calculate 
initial payments does not need to be the same as the rate of interest used to compute minimum 
guaranteed benefits. And, second, except for the computation of guaranteed benefits, the mortality 
tables do not need to be very conservative when the longevity risk is assumed by the retirees and 




The Benefit Guarantees Offered by US-style Variable Annuities 
 
C.1  Definition 
 
Variable annuities in the United States are deferred annuities that are used extensively during the 
accumulation stage in order to benefit from the tax advantages bestowed on them. They are in fact 
unit-linked investment products that are offered with a wide range of optional guarantees, covering 
minimum death, accumulation, income and withdrawal benefits. They also have an option to 
annuitize, which is exercised in less than 20 percent of cases. Variable annuity assets exceeded USD 
1.4 trillion in 2008 (about 10 percent of GDP) and have surpassed the assets backing fixed annuities 
by a wide margin.  
 
In recent years, US-style variable annuities have spread to Canada, Asia and Europe, including 
apparently Hungary and Poland among Central and Eastern European countries.
38 However, the 
volume of business is still small in European countries and the products are offered from offshore 
centers, especially Dublin. The 2008 global financial crisis and the large increase in stock market 
volatility have caused a setback in variable annuity sales. 
 
C.2  Types of Guaranteed Benefits 
 
The distinguishing features of US-style variable annuities are the allowance of flexible withdrawals 
and the offer of several guarantees. Withdrawals are permitted during both the accumulation and 
decumulation phases, subject to surrender charges that are imposed on a declining scale for the first 
few years after purchase to recoup the hefty commercial costs involved. This imparts greater liquidity 
and flexibility to fund management and addresses the growing concern of investors about the rising 
cost of long-term care. 
 
The offer of guarantees may only apply to the accumulation phase, or may also cover the payout 
stage but without requiring annuitization, or may even apply to the payout stage with annuitization. 
The guaranteed benefits incur charges which, even when they are transparent, are not easy to 
evaluate. The charges are clearly higher when potentially more generous options are offered to 
policyholders. Benefits are calculated on reduced values when withdrawals are made. The guaranteed 
benefits, which can be tailored to meet the varying needs of investors, include the following: 
 
Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation Benefit (GMAB). This guarantees a minimum capital 
accumulation for a given premium at a future date or dates. The simplest form is a return of paid 
premiums without any investment income. Other forms include the premium increased at a specified 
roll-up rate, the premium linked to inflation, or the ratchet value, given by the highest accumulation 
value attained at a contract anniversary.  
 
The guarantee returning the nominal value of premiums is not worth much, especially over long 
periods and in the presence of even moderate inflation. On the other hand, roll-up or ratchet values 
could be more valuable although they are also likely to cost much more. 
 
                                                             
38 The rapid expansion of US-style variable annuities in Canada, especially those with guaranteed lifetime 
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Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit (GMDB). This provides a minimum benefit upon death. It is 
generally paid during the accumulation phase but may also apply to the early part of the annuitization 
phase. It is usually a rebate of premiums paid, or premiums with investment income at a specified 
roll-up rate, or the accumulated value of the account at the time of death, whichever is higher. The 
guaranteed sum is adjusted for any withdrawals. The benefit may also be set at the ratchet value.  
 
Again, like for the accumulation benefit, this guarantee may or may not represent good value. In 
general, insurers tend to overcharge for this benefit, exploiting the need of policyholders for family 
protection.  
 
Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (GMWB). This provides a minimum withdrawal 
benefit for a specified number of years. The withdrawal benefit is set as a percentage of the 
guaranteed amount at the time this option is selected, i.e., it can be based on the value of the paid  
premium, the roll-up value, or the ratchet value. It continues for the specified number of years even if 
the account balance is exhausted. Upon death of the contract holder, any remaining account balance 
is included in the estate of the deceased. 
 
Lifetime Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (LGMWB). This is a more recent variation 
of the above and provides a minimum withdrawal benefit for life. It can be calculated in the same 
ways as the GMWB, i.e., it can be based on the value of the paid premium, the roll-up value, or the 
ratchet value. The value of the guarantee depends on the level of the minimum withdrawal benefit, 
the volatility of investment returns, and the fees charged by the providers. 
 
This benefit is paid for life but is not a life annuity. It differs from the latter in that the account 
balance does not benefit from survival credits while, upon the death of the account holder, any 
remaining balance is included in the estate of the deceased. It represents an interesting compromise 
between the conflicting objectives of longevity insurance with income security, on the one hand, and 
the demand for investment flexibility with long-run potential and the bequest motive, on the other. 
 
An interesting implication of the guaranteed living benefits offered by US-style variable annuities is 
that the cost of longevity insurance is paid by the living participants through the guarantee fees that 
are assessed on them. In contrast, in the case of traditional life annuities, the cost of longevity 
insurance is borne in an ex post sense by the dying annuitants.  
 
Since their introduction, variable annuities offering lifetime guaranteed minimum withdrawal 
benefits have been expanding at a rapid pace in both the United States and Canada. They seem to 
address both the need for flexibility and liquidity and the bequest motive of annuitants. Recent 
research has highlighted the importance of both the need to provide for the growing cost of long-term 
care, which is a crucial driver of precautionary savings, and the bequest motive, which continues to 
be strong and prevalent among large sections of the population (Ameriks et al, 2011). However, 
pricing and hedging the guarantees face considerable difficulties because actuaries have to project 
economic mortality risk linked not just to income and wealth but to the account balance of annuitants 
and the level and type of the guaranteed lifelong benefits. 
 
Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit (GMIB). This provides a minimum income in the payout 
phase through annuitization. It is effectively a guaranteed lifetime annuity option where the 
conversion rate is fixed at the time the premium is paid. Contract terms may include guaranteed 
periods of payment, a death benefit in cases of early death in the payout phase, and the possibility of 
regular premiums.  47 
 
 
The guaranteed conversion rate for additional premiums reflects prevailing market conditions at the 
time the additional premiums are paid. In general, the conversion rate is calculated at an AIR that is 
below market levels, while a conservative mortality table is also applied. At the time when the 
annuitization option can be exercised, policy holders have the right to select between the GMIB or an 
annuity purchased at then current rates or to let the option expire.  
 
Once the annuitization option is exercised, the payout annuity may take the form of a fixed annuity at 
the guaranteed level or at another level negotiated at that time or it may take the form of a unit-linked 
payout annuity, subject to a guaranteed payout annuity floor (GPAF). The latter guarantees a 
minimum benefit during the payout phase and may involve restrictions on asset allocation, limiting 
selection to a few designated funds and also requiring periodic rebalancing (Dellinger 2006). Of 
course, annuitants may also select a unit-linked VPA without any guarantees. 
 
C.3  Regulatory Issues 
 
The offer of US-style VAs (and VPAs) with guarantees presupposes effective access to hedging 
facilities through the use of various derivative products, including equity options and interest rate 
swaps. The guarantees incur charges that are higher for more generous benefits and reflect the cost of 
hedging and the cost of capital and profit for the providers as well as asset management fees and 
various account maintenance and administration expenses.  
 
The pricing and reserving policies of these policies raise complex issues. Their offer entails major 
risk management challenges and requires the use of dynamic hedging programs and sophisticated 
asset liability models. A particular difficulty is created by the offer of various options to 
policyholders. Developing models that provide accurate predictions of the future behavior of 
policyholders in response to changing market conditions has been a very difficult challenge. 
 
Rigidly regulating the prices of the various guarantees offered by these products would be 
inconceivable. Even requiring a high level of transparency would not be very helpful without a clear 
framework for evaluating the value of such guarantees. The most that could be envisaged would be a 
regulation capping the spread over the actual cost of hedging that providers could pass on to 
annuitants. But this would imply a variable fee for covering these costs, which may be even more 
difficult to monitor and police effectively. 
 
At present, most providers charge a fixed fee that covers the cost of all the guarantees included in a 
contract. However, providers vary the asset management fees charged on the various underlying 
funds when they are concerned about their growing exposure to particular asset classes. These fees, 
which are subject to short notice requirements, aim to encourage policyholders to switch to other 
funds. Available data show a very wide dispersion of total insurance and investment fees that may 
range from 1 to 5 percent (Milevsky and Shao 2010) 
 
Acquisition costs, which mainly include hefty commissions paid to selling brokers, also are an 
important expense component. Policyholders are subject to declining surrender charges for a period 
ranging from four to seven years. In the US, 80 percent of sales of VAs are from exchanged policies 
as policyholders seek newer products with more attractive features once the surrender charge period 
is over (Sigma 2008). They are encouraged in this by brokers who are anxious to increase their 
commission income.  
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This feature as well as higher volatility in financial markets tend to increase the costs of offering 
these products. However, the complexity of VA policies impedes comparability of both benefits and 
charges and allows providers to pass higher costs to consumers. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which regulates VAs alongside state insurance regulators, has issued a guide in which 
it warns consumers that they do pay for each benefit provided by a variable annuity policy and 
advises them to understand the charges, consider carefully if they need the benefit, and whether they 
can obtain it more cheaply through a separate product (SEC 2010). 
 
ConsumerReports.org notes in an openly accessible website feature that variable annuities have long 
had a tarnished reputation among personal-finance experts in the United States because of the 
aggressive sales tactics, exorbitant fees, and confusing terms associated with them. While it 
acknowledges that variable annuities with lifetime guaranteed minimum benefits performed well in 
the recent financial crisis, it concludes that variable annuities are best for people who have a very 
high income and have maxed out their other retirement accounts (Consumer Reports 2009).  
 
Reserving policies for variable annuities with guarantees are particularly challenging. This is an issue 
that has not been fully resolved yet, but recent experience suggests that the most effective approach 
in ensuring the solvency of providers and their ability to honor their commitments is to require 
effective use of dynamic hedging programs. 
 
This has been underscored by the large losses that were recently suffered by ManuLife Financial, the 
Canadian insurer, which decided in 2004 to terminate hedging the equity positions it held in its 
variable annuity business. This approach boosted profits for a number of years but generated large 
losses when markets collapsed in 2008 (Perkins 2008). 
 
Large increases in market volatility raise the cost of hedging but failure to hedge may give rise to 
much bigger problems. However, the effectiveness of hedging programs may itself come into 
question when financial markets suffer serious turmoil and volatility reaches very high levels. 
Hedging markets withstood the global crisis of 2008 but there is no certainty that they would have 
been able to survive without the massive support that was then provided to the financial markets as 
well as to leading individual financial institutions by the governments and central banks of the largest 
countries in the world.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis various proposals have been advanced to make 
hedging compulsory and to require the use of standardized, exchange-traded hedging products. The 
former would prevent the large exposure of providers to sudden changes in market volatility, while 
the latter would contain their exposure to counterparty risk, which can be very significant in 
customized derivatives that are traded on over-the-counter (OTC) markets. However, both 
suggestions face serious practical difficulties. Compulsory hedging needs to allow for the use of 
natural hedges, such as the parallel offer of equity-linked life insurance and lifetime guaranteed 
minimum withdrawal benefits, while the use of standardized, exchange-traded products may lack the 
flexibility to handle the lapse and surrender behavior of policyholders. Regulators would need to 
monitor closely the exposure of providers to counterparty risk and also to evaluate carefully provider 
models that aim to predict the likely behavior of policy holders in exercising the various options 
offered to them. 
 
The regulatory issues raised by variable annuities with a wide range of guarantees are currently under 
study by the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS), 
now the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA), which also plays a 49 
 
leading role in the development of the new Solvency II regime for insurance operations. A working 
party of experts, that was appointed to study this topic, circulated its report in November 2010 
(CEIOPS 2010), for public comment and discussion. 
 
Given the complexity of the regulatory issues and the need to have access to well-developed and 
efficient securities and hedging markets, it is fair to conclude that US-style variable annuities with a 
wide range of optional guarantees should not be included in the menu of retirement products that are 
authorized for the mandatory second pillar of middle and low-income countries. Such products could 
of course be made available to voluntary savings. 
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